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HEARINGS ON REGULATING ACCOUNTANTS ANNOUNCED
The need for mandatory federal regulation of certified public 
accountants versus voluntary self-regulation by the accounting 
profession will be probed during three days of Congressional hearings 
that begin on Monday, January 30, 1978.
Rep. John E. Moss, Chairman of the House Commerce Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations, which will conduct the hearings, said 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' recent proposals 
for self-regulation will be extensively examined to determine whether 
they can adequately protect the public, ensure the competence and 
integrity of CPAs and promote competition in the profession.
Moss said: "There are over twenty-five million individual 
investors in this country’s publicly-held corporations who rely 
heavily on independent accountants to ensure that corporate financial 
statements are accurate and truthful. The investing public is painfully 
aware of the recent reports of illegal payments and corporate slush 
funds which were either kept off the corporate books, or artfully 
concealed under the rubric of 'generally accepted accounting principles.'" 
As we seek to restore the confidence of investors in the fairness of 
the securities markets, the question now is whether the AICPA proposals 
are capable of ensuring integrity and competition in the accounting 
profession. If we find they are not, I will not hesitate to introduce 
the necessary legislation."
Scheduled witnesses for Monday, January 30, are: Honorable 
Charles Percy, Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Reports, Accounting and Management; Mr. Stanley J. Scott, Chairman 
of the Soard of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants;
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the AICPA's SEC Practice 
Section; Mr. Don Neebes, Chairman of the Peer Review Committee of the 
AICPA's SEC Practice Section; Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman of the 
Public Oversight Board of the AICPA's SEC Practice Section; Mr. Ray 
Garrett, member of the Public Oversight Board; and Mr. Harvey Kapnick, 
Managing Partner of Arthur Andersen § Co., one of the "Big Eight" 
accounting firms.
Witnesses for Tuesday, January 31, include: Mr. Eli Mason, 
Managing Partner of Mason § Co., New York; Mr. Joseph Alam, 
Managing Partner of Alam § Co., Detroit; Mr. Alan Brout, Managing 
Partner of Brout § Co., New York; and Mr. Charles Kaiser, Managing 
Partner of Harris, Kerr, Forster § Co. of Los Angeles.
On the third and final day of hearings, Wednesday, February 1, 
the witnesses will be: Mr. Norman Auerbach, Chairman of Coopers § 
Lybrand, one of the "Big Eight" accounting firms; Dr. John C. Burton, 
Professor of Business at Columbia University; and Honorable Harold M. 
Williams, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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As I begin my remarks today, I would like to pay tribute to the 
late Senator Lee Metcalf. Senator Metcalf was one of the most decent and 
gentle men in the United States Senate. He was a man who could think no 
evil of others and always went out of his way to find the good in his 
fellow man.
But Lee Metcalf was also a battler for those causes he thought were 
right. I have had the pleasure of serving for many years on the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee with Senator Metcalf. He has taken major 
positive roles in the work of the Committee — creating the Congressional 
Budget Act, protecting the rights of privacy of all Americans, and all the 
energy reorganization work the Committee has done including the creation of 
the new Department of Energy.
In recent years I worked most closely with him on his vigorous over­
sight of the Federal Advisory Committee Act which resulted in the reduction 
of several hundreds of Federal advisory committees. The work of the present 
administration in this regard is but an extension of the work Senator Metcalf 
began several years ago.
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This past year: Senator Metcalf focused his energy on the accounting 
profession and began the first serious inquiry into the profession in decades. 
The work Senator Metcalf has already done has led to a new spirit of self- 
reform within the profession and to more active involvement by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. I certainly intend to keep this work alive in the 
committee and to follow through on Senator Metcalf’s initiative.
Today I would like to review the work of the Senate to date on the 
accounting profession and to attempt to set the stage for your hearings.
The Reports, Accounting and Management Subcommittee staff began a 
study of the profession in the fall of 1975 and issued a staff report in 
January, 1977, entitled The Accounting Establishment. That report made a 
number of criticisms of the accounting profession and made a number of recom­
mendations, generally calling for an increased Federal role in the accounting 
profession. The reaction of the profession to the staff report could charitably 
be described as negative.
In April, May and June of last year the Subcommittee held eight days 
of public hearings in which a broad range of witnesses appeared representing 
many viewpoints about the profession. The profession itself generally asked 
that existing private organizations in the profession be allowed time, in 
cooperation with the SEC, to work out reforms before Congress should consider 
mandatory legislation.
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It was apparent during the hearings that the SEC and leaders in the 
accounting profession recognize that meaningful reforms were needed in the 
way they perform their responsibilities. Members of the Subcommittee were 
encouraged by pledges of timely action within the accounting profession to 
achieve reform. Therefore, in a unanimous report of the Subcommittee signed 
by all five Senators in November, 1977, the Subcommittee agreed that the pro­
fession itself should be allowed to take the lead in meeting the goals out­
lined by the Committee in its report. As the Committee report states, "Self­
initiated action by the private sector in cooperation with the SEC is the 
method of reform preferred by Subcommittee members." However, the Subcommittee 
went on immediately to say that "The Subcommittee recognizes Congressional 
responsibility to continue oversight of this process, and to propose mandatory 
reforms if meaningful progress is not made on a timely basis."
Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend the remainder of my time summarizing 
what the Reports, Accounting and Management Subcommittee feels are needed re­
forms within the accounting profession, hopefully to be achieved by self-initiated 
actions by the profession itself but in any event necessary to achieve by what­
ever means. It is my hope that your Subcommittee in this set of hearings can 
ascertain which, if any, of these goals have been achieved by the profession 
and the SEC since the Senate Subcommittee hearings last summer.
In the area of accounting standards, the Subcommittee generally endorsed 
the recommendations of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) Structure Com­
mittees report. These recommendations of the FAF Structure Committee included 
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opening up meetings of the FASB, strengthening the organization of the FASB, 
increasing involvement in the FASB from all segments of its broad constituency 
and broadening the base of FASB financial support. I am pleased that the FASB 
has already moved to implement some of these recommendations including opening 
up its meetings.
The Subcommittee also recommended that financial reports of publicly 
owned corporations be made more understandable to the unsophisticated user 
while still providing sufficient information for the sophisticated user.  
The Subcommittee also recommended that uniformity in the development 
and application of accounting standards must be a major goal of the FASB. The 
Subcommittee stated that it "Strongly believes that the clarity and compara­
bility of corporate financial statements will be substantially inproved if 
uniform accounting standards are used to report the same type of business trans­
actions ."
In the area of auditing and auditing standards, the Subcommittee had 
a number of recommendations.
Some of them include:
1) A program of external quality review for accounting firms to be 
performed at least every three years. The reports of these peer reviews should 
be submitted to the SEC and made available to the public. The Subcommittee strongly
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feels that financial data and operating information of accounting firms should 
be made public just as is such information of publicly owned corporations that 
accounting firms audit.
2) The Subcommittee strongly feels, as does Chairman Williams of the 
SEC, that independent audit committees should be established in all publicly 
owned corporations. The Subcommittee feels that independent audit committees 
composed of outside directors be a condition for being audited by an independent 
outside auditor. If there is one single idea that the Subcommittee strongly 
endorses it is this idea of independent audit committees composed of outside 
directors. And by "outside" we mean truly outside and divorced from any re­
lationship with the corporation. In this regard, we would feel that the New 
York Stock Exchange rules allowing the corporation's banker 
or the corporation's outside legal counsel to be on the audit committee is in­
sufficient. We feel that there is too direct a link between such parties as 
these in the corporation and we do not consider them truly independent, outside 
directors.
3) In another major area, the Subcommittee recommends that independent 
auditors of publicly owned corporations perform only services directly related 
to accounting. Non-accounting management services such as executive recruit­
ment, marketing analysis, plant layout, product analysis, and actuarial services 
are incompatible with the public responsibilities of independent auditors and 
should be discontinued.
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4) The Subcommittee feels that there should be stronger mandates to 
independent auditors to report illegal activities. Any illegal activities 
uncovered by the auditor must be reported to the corporation’s audit committee 
and the appropriate government authorities. It is no longer sufficient to 
be concerned by illegal activities only if they have a material affect on the 
financial statements of the corporation. There should be an affirmative obli­
gation of auditors to seek out material fraud and illegal or questionable acts.
5) The Subcommittee also recommended that the accounting profession 
should establish some sort of organization of accounting firms which serve as 
independent auditors for publicly owned corporations. To be effective, any 
such organization must include all accounting firms which audit publicly owned 
corporations and the organization must have the power to impose sanctions on 
members which do not meet the organization’s performance and behavior standards. 
The AICPA has already made a step in this direction in its annual meeting in 
September of this past year.
Mr. Chairman, the other recommendations of the Senate Subcommittee are 
spelled out in the report which the Subcommittee issued unanimously in November 
of this past year. It is my hope that your hearings can determine what progress 
has been made toward these goals by the profession and the SEC since the hear­
ings we conducted last summer. To restate a point I made earlier, it is the 
preference of the Senate Subcommittee that self-initiated action by the private 
sector in cooperation with the SEC be the root of reform. However, it is 
mandatory upon us both in the House and Senate to maintain continuous oversight 
over these activities.
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One of the major reasons that the Senate Subcommittee is willing 
to let the profession take the initiative in self-regulation is that in­
creasingly our Committee feels that there should be more de-regulation of 
industries and professions. As you knew, major efforts are currently be­
ing made to de-regulate the airline industry. Legislation is also pending 
in the Senate, introduced by Senator Robert Byrd, Senator Ribicoff and me, 
and in the House, introduced by Congressman John Anderson and Congresswoman 
Jordan, to apply a sunset procedure to regulatory agencies.
Regulatory reform can mean the reduction of vast amounts of regula­
tory efforts and paperwork. Therefore, at the same time we are reducing 
regulatory requirements in other areas, it seems only right to give the 
accounting profession the opportunity to initiate reforms internally, be­
fore imposing new government regulation.
Mr. Chairman, although it is unclear at this point who will assume 
Senator Metcalf's duties as chairman of the Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment Subcommittee, I pledge to you and members of the accounting profession 
my continuing interest and concern in this area. It would be my hope that 
the Senate Subcommittee would hold hearings this coming July after the SEC 
has issued its first annual report on activities and progress in the account­
ing profession. I think that can be a continuing step in monitoring progress 
in this most important field and I look forward to continuing cooperation 
with you and your House colleagues on this most important matter.
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Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Stanley J. Scott. I am currently the 
chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants, an organization of 135,000 certified public ac­
countants. It is fair to say that this is the largest or­
ganization of CPAs in the world and that a substantial per­
centage of all CPAs in the United States are members of it. 
This post, as I am sure you know, is a voluntary, unpaid one. 
My gainful occupation is as managing partner of Alford, Meroney 
& Company, a local accounting firm with offices in Texas and 
New Mexico. We have 31 partners and we audit 11 SEC reporting 
companies.
Also with me today are Walter E. Hanson, Chairman 
of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA sponsored Division 
for CPA Firms, Mr. Hanson is also Chairman of Peat, Marwick 
Mitchell & Company; Donald L. Neebes, Chairman of the Peer 
Review Committee of the SEC Practice Section and also a partner 
of Ernst & Ernst; and Wallace E. Olson, President and chief 
staff officer of the AICPA.
Also in the audience is Glen Ingram, Jr., Chairman 
of the Private Companies Practice Section Executive Committee. 
Mr. Ingram is also the head of Glen Ingram & Co. and is avail­
able to answer any questions about the operations of the section. 
We regard the Private Companies Practice Section 
as being equally important to the performance of the profession 
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as the SEC Practice Section even though its activities may 
be less visible because it deals with serving companies which 
are not publicly traded. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, 
assisting smaller business enterprises is a critical factor 
in maintaining a healthy and diversified economy..
The Private Practice Section is substantially 
parallel to that of the SEC Practice Section but provides a 
means for tailoring the requirements of practice to better fit 
the needs of smaller companies and the smaller CPA firms 
which serve them.
The balance of my formal comments are devoted prin­
cipally to the profession's actions to improve the performance 
of audits of companies required to file reports with the SEC.
The AICPA has submitted to this Subcommittee a 
memorandum discussing the extensive measures which the In­
stitute has taken in response to your constructive urgings, 
Mr. Chairman, to those of the late Senator Metcalf and his 
subcommittee, and those which we have received from many 
quarters, including members of our profession and users of 
financial information. I will not repeat the detail of that 
submission. Rather I would in these brief remarks, address 
some of the major concerns which I know you, Mr. Chairman, 
have with respect to the ability of the profession to do, 
without new legislation, what is necessary to assure the quality 
of performance which the public may reasonably expect from 
the accounting profession.
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The Wall Street Journal of January 11, 1978, pur­
porting to quote members of your staff, stated well the funda­
mental question before you — and the profession. One of 
your staff members was quoted as saying ’’The hearings later 
this month are designed to probe 'whether or not self-regulatory 
measures of the AICPA are adequate and have been enforced.'"
I will not question that in the past our capacity 
to impose disciplinary sanctions has not been fully satisfactory 
in the eyes of our critics. In my estimation, several reasons 
account for whatever failings exist with respect to the pro­
fession's discipline and compliance. First, only state boards 
of accountancy have the power to bar accountants from their 
practice of public accounting. In addition, of course, the 
SEC can bar accountants from practicing before it and it has 
often exercised that authority. The state boards' authority 
is limited to action against individuals; generally, they can­
not act against firms. Second, the Institute is composed of 
individuals. Accounting today, at least as it relates to 
publicly held companies, is practiced by firms. Until re­
cently we did not have the means to impose disciplinary actions 
on firms since only individuals are members of the Institute. 
Third, we have a concern to assure that effective discipline of firms 
does not unfairly compromise the rights and protections of 
individuals who, like all Americans,are entitled to due process 
and fair trial.
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We have now developed a mechanism for bringing dis­
ciplinary actions against firms through the establishment of 
the Division for CPA Firms, which consists of two sections, 
one concerned with firms having or wishing to prepare for an 
SEC practice and the other concerned with firms and individuals 
who serve privately held clients. Through the SEC Practice 
Section we are able for the first time to impose upon firms 
that practice before the SEC, disclosure requirements, practice 
requirements, peer review requirements, disciplinary procedures — 
all in full view of the public and subject to the oversight 
of an extraordinarily distinguished Public Oversight Board.
The names of the members who have thus far accepted appointment to 
the Public Oversight Board, John J. McCloy, Ray Garrett and 
William L. Cary, without further comment, justify the quality 
of surveillance you and we may expect.
As you know, any firm may enroll in the SEC Practice 
Section. It has been suggested that the existence of the 
section may be adverse to the interests of smaller firms. It 
is difficult to discern why this should be so. Dues in the 
section will be relatively small; a firm with 10 or 15 partners 
will pay perhaps $100 or $150 a year. Many small banks have 
benefited over the years in being able to say, like their 
larger brethern, that they provide the same FDIC protection 
for depositors. Smaller firms, like mine, will be able to ap­
proach a greater parity with large firms by being able to 
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state that we are subject to the same continuing education, 
peer review, disciplinary, filing and other requirements as 
the very largest firms.
It is true, of course, that the demand for more 
quality control and the procedures necessary to assure re­
liable financial information do impose additional costs on 
the profession. Peer reviews, educational programs, and 
other characteristics of the effort to upgrade audit work 
all cost money. The small firms seek no dispensation from 
high quality requirements, but they realize that any program — 
voluntary or governmentally mandated — has inherent in it 
costs that must be absorbed. Nevertheless smaller firms 
will not be at a disadvantage because the cost involved in 
their participation in the sections will, in our opinion,be 
fair and reasonable.
In the past the size and international scope of many 
publicly held companies have inevitably caused them to re­
tain the large CPA firms. Over 72 percent of the companies re­
porting to the SEC are audited by the 16 largest auditing firms. 
This is not the consequence of unfair trade practices or im­
proper conduct on the part of these firms; this is a conse­
quence of the operation of the competitive process which you, 
Mr. Chairman, have often defended with eloquence and fervor. 
The large firms are tough competitors. I know that full well 
from my personal experience. But I believe this to be a proper 
result of the competitive process.
-6-
The firms which audit approximately 75 percent of 
the companies that file reports with the SEC have already 
indicated their intention to associate with the SEC Practice 
Section. This is clear evidence that no governmental com­
pulsion is necessary to bring about broad submission to the 
disciplines which are going to be imposed by that section.
Comments have been made concerning the composition 
of the executive committee of the SEC Practice Section. As 
now constituted, each firm having 30 or more SEC registered 
clients has a place on the committee and five places are re­
served for firms with a lesser number of such clients. Thus, 
firms with less than 30 SEC registered clients have almost 
25 percent of the places on the executive committee.
Quite obviously, a firm with hundreds of the largest 
SEC clients is going to have a far greater interest in matters 
relating to such clients that a firm having one, two or five 
such clients, and such a firm will be much more willing to 
commit time and energy to the resolution of problems associated 
with such audits than a firm having a small number of clients. 
Is it not sensible then to reflect in a composition of the 
executive committee this reality?
Furthermore, criticism of the composition of the 
executive committee implies that in some way the interests of 
small firm members in the quality of their work are different 
from those of large firm members. I suggest this demeans 
the small firms which in my experience are as interested in 
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sound practices, continuing education, strong discipline 
and peer review as the large firms. When it comes to the 
soundness of auditing, the reliability of financial statements 
and the desire for effective corporate accountability, small 
firms and large firms have no differences.
Of greater importance than the composition of the 
executive committee and the competitive impact among CPA 
firms is the effectiveness of the Institute’s program for 
additional self-regulation. This must be considered in the context 
of the number of existing restraints on the conduct of auditors. 
Foremost among these is the SEC. While some have criticized 
the SEC’s failure to exercise to the full effectiveness its 
powers over the accounting profession, the fact is that from 
the viewpoint of the profession the Commission, particularly 
in recent years, has been rigorous in its pursuit of wrong­
doing in the profession. The extent of the Commission’s ef­
forts to govern accounting is seen in the number of accounting 
series releases: between 1933 and 1972, 133 releases were pub­
lished; since then 104 have been issued. In other words, 44 
percent of all ASRs have been issued in the last five years. 
Also, the SEC has brought 124 enforcement actions against ac­
countants between January 1974 and May 1977. Based on these 
statistics we believe that the Commission has in recent years 
been vigorous and attentive in regulating the accounting profession.
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But regardless of the past, SEC Chairman Williams 
has in testimony before the late Senator Metcalf's subcommittee, 
and in several speeches,promised even stronger effort by the 
Commission in the exercise of its powers over the accounting 
profession. This determination has already manifested itself 
in the steps the Commission is now taking to strengthen auditor 
independence. Among other measures, Chairman Williams has pro­
mised to report annually to Congress on the accounting profession 
and its performance. Regardless of what one may think of the 
SEC’s performance in the past, few would deny its activism now.
An additional restraint on the conduct of accountants 
is civil liability. The most dramatic example of this was the 
recent judgment against a major accounting firm in excess of 
$30 million. No accountant, Mr. Chairman, is going to expose 
himself to this kind of danger if there is any way to avoid 
it. There isn’t a major accounting firm in this country 
that has not found itself in litigation concerning large 
amounts of alleged damage. As the volume of litigation 
has swelled, so have liability premiums, imposing a heavy 
load on all firms.
It is in this context that the Institute’s program 
imposes another layer of discipline. Under the scrutiny of a 
Public Oversight Board that will be made up of five nationally 
famed and universally respected persons, the Institute’s program 
is arranged to assure the process is open and visible to the 
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fullest extent consistent with the protection of individual rights. 
The members of this board will not jeopardize reputations they 
have spent a lifetime building to protect an errant auditor 
from just reckoning. To do so would be totally contrary 
to human nature. The Institute is placing no restraints on 
the time these people spend on the affairs of the SEC Practice 
Section. While it is estimated each will spend a minimum of 
35-40 days on the work of the Board — the equivalent of 1/6 
of their working time — they may spend more if needed and 
they will, as the SEC has demanded, be paid well for that 
extra work. In addition, they will have ample staff to assist 
them in meeting their responsibilities.
We believe the Institute's new program will provide 
an effective layer of additional regulation and when combined 
with the existing restraints on auditors makes legislation 
unnecessary.
The concern that the Institute's program will be 
divisive of the profession is not a valid basis for substituting 
legislation for the Institute's program.
Every legislative program which we have heard of would 
draw a distinction between the SEC practice and the non-SEC 
practice firms. A program requiring either registration with 
the SEC or mandatory enrollment in any NASD-like organization 
clearly recognizes differences in practice within the profession — 
one directly regulated by the government or a quasi-governmental 
body, the other not so regulated.
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There is no way to avoid the simple fact that 
auditors of publicly-held companies have problems and re­
sponsibilities different from those of auditors who confine their 
practice to companies not having public shareholders.
The former are subject to SEC oversight and discipline; they 
are subject to suit by disgruntled shareholders; they are 
answerable to shareholders. The new Division for CPA Firms 
recognizes this reality -- as it should. However it minimizes 
the impact of the differences because it contemplates that 
many firms which do not have SEC clients would associate 
with the SEC Practice Section as a means of gaining the benefits 
that association might bring. By contrast, it is hard to 
imagine firms voluntarily placing themselves under a govern­
mentally imposed regulatory system. This is particularly true 
of smaller firms which share with other small businesses an 
even greater antipathy to governmental regulation than do larger 
enterprises.
We have proposed in our submission that instead of 
initiating legislation now, the Subcommittee, the Institute 
and the Public Oversight Board, agree upon a procedure to per­
mit timely monitoring by the Subcommittee of the program as 
it develops.
Mr. Chairman, as your Congressional career reaches 
its final year, you may take pride in the role you have played
-Il­
in spurring the accounting profession to undertake reform 
and in causing the SEC to reexamine its role. We are confident 
that the profession’s initiative to which you have contributed, 
combined with the heightened sensitivity of the SEC which you 
have caused, is creating a more effective system of governance 
of the accounting profession which will be a credit to you, 
the late Senator Metcalf, and all others who have played a role 
in bringing it about.
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Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to share my thoughts with you 
and with the other members of this subcommittee. I believe all partici­
pants in this hearing share a common goal — to ensure that the American 
public receives the highest quality services from the auditing profession 
and that the profession is prepared to assume the additional responsibilities 
many have been urging upon it.
As you know, I am here in my role as Chairman of the Executive Committee 
of the SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms sponsored by the 
AICPA. I would not have taken on this responsibility if I believed a 
legislative alternative would better serve the public interest. I believe 
the SEC Practice Section’s self-regulatory mechanisms are strong, will be 
effective, and can and will provide the assurance the American public 
deserves that audits of public companies are conducted in conformity with 
the highest standards of independence, competence, and integrity.
I have made a personal commitment to assure that the SEC Practice Section 
is in operation and achieving its purposes as expeditiously as possible. 
Because of the cooperation and support we have received from the profession 
thus far, we are well along in meeting this objective. There is, however, 
too little time for me to describe at any length the progress we have made. 
Instead I will focus my remarks on the elements of the SEC Practice 
Section’s structure that convince me that it will effectively serve the 
public interest.
The Public Oversight Board is the keystone of the SEC Practice Section — 
the stone that holds the others in place. I can assure you that those who 
conceived the structure of the section had in mind, figuratively speaking, 
the role of the keystone. The Public Oversight Board therefore is authorized 
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to investigate any matter pertaining to the SEC Practice Section, report 
publicly on any such matter, and make recommendations to the Executive 
Committee. There is no limit on its oversight activities. But the basis 
of the power of the Public Oversight Board lies in the quality of the 
persons who will serve on it and their access to public opinion. So long 
as the Public Oversight Board includes persons whose independence and 
integrity are so unquestioned that they have the power, through public 
statements of disapproval, to destroy the reputation of the section, the 
Public Oversight Board will function as a keystone. I believe that in 
men like John J. McCloy, Ray Garrett, and William L. Cary, we have members 
whose integrity and independence are not only nationally, but internationally, 
respected. I also believe that persons with this degree of public stature — 
and the ability to influence public opinion — would not agree to serve on 
the Public Oversight Board if the position were full time, requiring them 
to sever all their other connections. Even on a part-time basis, however, 
members are expected to devote a substantial part of their time. In addition, 
of course, they can employ whatever professional staff they need to carry 
out their function.
To be more explicit, if a Public Oversight Board composed of persons who 
have earned the public trust openly condemns the functioning of the section, 
the press, members of the Congress, and the SEC will not let the matter 
rest until it is remedied. I submit that those who have decided to serve 
on the Board are held in such high esteem that public opinion would join 
them if they expressed opposition to the conduct of the SEC Practice Section.
Although the initial membership of the Public Oversight Board will reassure 
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the public about the operations of the SEC Practice Section, the continuation 
of the Board’s effectiveness depends on a succession of Board members equally 
committed to the public interest. Therefore, it should be noted that the 
Public Oversight Board’s freedom to oversee the operations of the Section 
includes the freedom to make recommendations to enhance its own effectiveness, 
including recommendations with respect to the appointment, tenure, and 
succession of its members. If, after reviewing its own operations, it 
concludes that changes are needed in order to assure its continued effectiveness, 
it can recommend those changes to the Executive Committee, and if the 
Board believes there are threats to its continued effectiveness that are not 
being appropriately remedied, it can make public that conviction.
There will be five members of the Public Oversight Board. The term of 
service is three years, but appointments are renewable. The Public Oversight 
Board is responsible to publish periodic reports on the results of its 
oversight activities and to fully inform the SEC and Congress. They will 
engage their own staff to assist in carrying out functions. Board members 
may attend any meetings of the Executive Committee or any other activity 
of the Section.
The Public Oversight Board provides assurance that the Section’s peer review 
and regulatory system will be effective. It will, both personally and 
through its own staff, monitor and evaluate the activities of the Peer 
Review Committee and specifically determine whether the Peer Review 
Committee is following up remedial actions firms take as a result of the 
reviews.
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I have long believed that peer reviews are an effective mechanism to ensure 
that firms provide quality auditing services. They work because of the 
professional integrity of the reviewers. In addition, a peer review is a 
professional engagement, and the reviewing firm must be prepared to accept 
full responsibility for the quality of its work, including the threat of 
legal liability for substandard work. Under these circumstances, there is 
no motivation to bias the peer review in favor of the reviewed firm. 
Nevertheless, I believe even those who fear biased reviewers will recognize 
that the Public Oversight Board’s regular evaluation of all aspects of 
the peer review system will assure that it achieves its goals.
In order to carry out its charge, the Peer Review Committee has been given 
a number of specific functions. It is responsible for administering reviews 
of section members and for establishing standards for conducting and reporting 
on the reviews. It recommends as it sees fit sanctions and other disciplinary 
measures to the Executive Committee, and it is required to consult from time 
to time with the Public Oversight Board.
The Peer Review Committee has already had two meetings and has made its first 
progress report to the Executive Committee. Its initial objective is to 
develop a program in time for member firms to have peer reviews in 1978. 
In order to meet this objective the Committee has established six sub­
committees and task forces:
The Planning Subcommittee will develop agendas for the Committee’s 
meetings, monitor the progress of other subcommittees and of task 
forces, and prepare progress reports for submission to the 
Executive Committee and the Public Oversight Board.
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The Subcommittee on Administration of Regular Peer Reviews 
will develop the administrative policies and procedures for 
regular peer reviews, oversee the work of the Committee 
staff responsible for administering regular peer reviews, 
and ascertain that firms are taking appropriate corrective 
action as a result of regular peer review. In addition it 
will consider the circumstances under which exceptions to 
the mandatory partner rotation requirement might be granted 
and the question of authorizing alternative procedures in 
place of the required concurring review of the audit report 
in situations where the size of the member firm prevents 
fulfillment of this requirement.
The Subcommittee to Develop Guidelines for Performing Regular 
Peer Reviews will not only develop such guidelines but also 
consult with the Continuing Professional Education Division 
with respect to developing training materials for peer reviews.
The other task forces and subcommittees are the Task Force 
to Develop Policies and Procedures for Peer Review Committee 
Oversight of Regular Peer Reviews, the Task Force to Develop 
Policy Statement with Respect to Regular Peer Reviews Performed 
by State Societies and Associations, and the Subcommittee to 
Develop Standards for Performing and Reporting on Regular Peer 
Reviews.
The Chairman of the Peer Review Committee has met with the Acting Chief 
Accountant of the SEC (Mr. A. Clarence Sampson), and there are plans to 
keep the SEC fully informed about the Committee’s activities.
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Although membership in the SEC Practice Section is voluntary, we expect 
all firms engaged in SEC practice to join the section. At last count, 
442 firms auditing about 7,500 SEC registrants have applied for membership, 
impressive numbers given the fact that the section is still in its 
formative stages.
The basic requirements for membership in the SEC Practice Section are 
briefly as follows:
(1) The firm must adhere to the quality control standards 
of the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee.
(2) The firm must submit to peer reviews every three years 
or at such other times as designated by the Executive committee.
(3) The firm’s professional personnel must each undertake at 
least 40 hours of continuing professional education annually.
(4) Audit partners on individual SEC engagements for a period of 
five consecutive years must be replaced by new audit partners.
(5) Audit reports of SEC registrants must be reviewed by a partner 
other than the engagement partner and may not be issued without 
the reviewer's concurrence.
(6) Specified financial, organizational, and other information must 
be filed with the Section annually.
(7) Minimum amounts and types of liability insurance must be 
maintained.
(8) The firm may not perform management advisory services for SEC 
audit clients if the services would create a loss of independence 
for the purpose of expressing opinions on the client’s financial 
statements; are predominantly commercial in character and 
inconsistent with the firm's professional status as certified 
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public accountants; or are inconsistent with the firm’s 
responsibilities to the public. The Section has already 
proscribed consulting in the areas of psychological testing, 
public opinion polls, and merger and acquisition assistance 
for a finder’s fee. In addition, members may not perform 
the non-financial-related aspects of former services provided 
under the headings of marketing consulting and plant layout. 
Moreover, the Executive Committee has on its agenda the review 
of other criticized services to determine whether they should 
be proscribed.
(9) Member firms must report annually to the Audit Committee or 
Board of Directors (or its equivalent if the client is a 
partnership) of each SEC audit client total fees obtained from 
the client for management advisory services in the year under 
audit and must describe in the report the types of such services.
(10) Member firms must also report to the same groups mentioned 
in (9) the nature of disagreements with management on financial 
accounting and reporting matters and auditing procedures which, 
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused the issuance 
of a qualified opinion.
Voluntary membership is effective because the SEC Practice Section establishes 
the highest professional credentials and qualifications for auditing SEC 
registered companies. Accounting firms, in their own interest, will wish to 
assure themselves they are meeting these qualifications by joining the
Section.
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The SEC Practice Section has strong penalties for failure to adhere to 
its requirements. These range from admonishment to suspension or 
expulsion from the Section, and include monetary fines. More importantly, 
however, they include corrective measures to remedy deficiencies in 
practice. The threat of these penalties will provide strong motivation 
for compliance with the SEC Practice Section’s requirements. For 
instance, it will motivate firms to respond swiftly to recommendations 
from peer review teams.
The SEC Practice Section is designed to represent the interests of all 
member firms. As discussed in Mr. Scott’s testimony, the firms with less 
than 30 SEC clients are fairly represented on the Executive Committee, 
with nearly 25 percent of the seats. Also, the Section’s voting require­
ments have been carefully arranged to prevent domination of the Section 
by the largest eight accounting firms. Membership applications indicate 
that small firms recognize the intent and effectiveness of this design. 
Of the 442 firms that have applied for membership in the SEC Practice 
Section, approximately 375 have 0,1, or 2 SEC clients.
I am pleased but not surprised by this response. I believe it is recognition 
not only of adequate representation on the Executive Committee, but also of 
the fact that large accounting firms are not a monolithic bloc. For instance, 
historical voting records indicate that the large accounting firms represented 
on the Executive Committee will not vote as a bloc. The written comments 
and position papers submitted to the FASB by large accounting firms and 
their testimony at last year’s hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting and Management provide evidence that their opinions 
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differ on professional issues. For example, an analysis of five key 
statements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board shows that in no case 
were the largest eight firms unanimous in their positions and on only 25 
percent of the major issues did even a simple majority of the eight firms 
take the same position.
Taken together, the fair representation of smaller firms on the Executive 
Committee, the widespread interest in membership by smaller firms, and 
the lack of monolithic voting patterns by the large firms demonstrate and 
ensure that the interests of the smaller firms will be served by the SEC 
Practice Section. In addition, the Public Oversight Board will monitor 
the activities of the Executive Committee, providing the public and the 
smaller firms with the assurance of fair representation of all interests.
It is worth noting that firms that join the SEC Practice Section will 
not, thereby, be subjected to higher standards of accounting, auditing, 
quality control, and ethics. These standards are the same for all firms 
because they are set by boards and committees outside the SEC Practice 
Section and apply to all AICPA members, whether their firms are members 
of the SEC Practice Section, the Private Companies Practice Section, or 
no section at all.
- Accounting standards are set by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 
Auditing standards are set by the Auditing Standards Executive 
Committee,
For details, see testimony of Walter E. Hanson before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Reports, Accounting, and Management, May 12, 1977.
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Quality control standards are set by the Quality Control 
Standards Committee, and
Ethical standards are set by the Professional Ethics Executive 
Committee.
The primary functions of the Executive Committee, and indeed the SEC 
Practice Section, are to assure that member firms practicing before the 
SEC meet these professional standards and to discipline those that do not.
In order that the position of the five representatives of the smaller 
firms be put in full perspective, the following additional details of the 
organization and responsibilities of the Executive Committee should be 
borne in mind.
The Committee may not consist of fewer than 21 members, and terms 
are for three years, with initial staggered terms to provide for 
seven expirations each year. Representatives are appointed by the 
Chairman of the AICPA with the approval of the AICPA's Board of 
Directors. Nominations for appointment are made by a seven-member 
nominating committee elected by the AICPA Council. The chairman 
of the Executive Committee is elected by the committee membership 
and may not serve more than three one-year terms.
The Executive Committee establishes general policies for the 
section, may amend the requirements for membership, establishes 
budgets and dues requirements, and determines sanctions to be 
imposed on member firms based upon the recommendations of the 
Peer Review Committee. In addition, the Executive Committee 
is responsible for acting upon complaints received with respect 
to actions by member firms. It also selects persons to serve 
on the Public Oversight Board and meets with the Board as requested.
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Finally, the Executive Committee is responsible to make recommendations 
as it sees fit to other AICPA boards and committees for their considera­
tion.
Thirteen members of the Executive Committee constitute a quorum 
for the conduct of business. Eleven affirmative votes are required 
for action except in the following two cases. Thirteen affirmative 
votes must be cast in order to amend membership requirements and in 
order to determine sanctions to be imposed on members. As I 
mentioned before, the large firms have not voted as a bloc in the 
past, and are not expected to do so in the future. Nevertheless, the 
voting system is designed to prevent even the possibility of domina­
tion by the eight largest accounting firms. The thirteen member 
quorum prevents those eight firms from stopping committee action 
by refusing to attend. And because no more than thirteen votes 
are required to carry any measure, a majority exclusive of the 
eight largest firms has the power to take action the eight may oppose.
One of the advantages of the new AICPA structure is that it gives recognition 
to long-standing differences in types of accounting practice. Congress, 
through the Securities Acts and the powers it gave to the SEC, has 
recognized that publicly-held companies are to be treated differently from
As a practical matter, AICPA boards and committees have historically not 
made important policy decisions without obtaining the votes, positive or 
negative, of virtually all members. Thus the quorum requirement is 
essentially a technicality.
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private companies. The requirements for practice before the Commission 
are different from those for private-company practice. The public is better 
served if the profession’s regulatory mechanisms can focus on the specific 
needs of practice before the Commission, and private companies are better 
served if the profession’s regulatory mechanisms can focus on their specific 
needs and problems and relieve them of requirements that are not germane 
to their practice.
I am certain that the ongoing affairs of the SEC Practice Section will be 
influenced by the oversight efforts of the SEC. Chairman Williams has 
explicitly promised that the Commission will be vigilant and will include 
an assessment of the profession in its annual report to Congress. More­
over, the history of the SEC’s relationship to the profession strongly 
argues that the Commission will use its powers freely to influence the 
SEC Practice Section.
The AICPA maintains regular communication with the staff of the SEC. For 
instance, the Committee on SEC Regulations meets regularly with the staff 
of the Commission, and the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, which 
sets auditing standards for the profession, benefits from a two-way exchange 
of views with the Commission.
The Commission’s influence on the profession is also illustrated by the 
steps it has taken to ensure auditor independence. There is an independence 
requirement in SEC Regulation S-X (Rule 2-01), and the Commission has 
over the years devoted nine Accounting Series Releases to the subject, the 
earliest issued in 1937 and the most recent a month and a half ago. In 
addition, Accounting Series Releases 165 and 194 prescribe disclosure 
requirements designed to protect audit independence.
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The Commission also exercises a disciplinary force over SEC practitioners 
through its enforcement proceedings, which can result in injunctive actions. 
It has suspended and in some cases disqualified CPAs from SEC practice, 
suspended firms from taking on registered companies as clients, and imposed 
peer reviews and quality control improvements on firms. In short, when 
one examines the Commission’s powers and their exercise, it becomes clear 
that the SEC has been, and will continue to be, significantly involved in 
the regulation of the profession.
I would like to emphasize that the Division for Firms adds a layer of 
regulation the profession formerly did not have. It replaces nothing. 
Thus the effectiveness of the profession's regulatory environment is 
based on the interaction of both the previously developed and the recently 
introduced mechanisms. I have just described the SEC’s ongoing role in 
the regulatory process. The courts have played and will continue to play a 
major role. In addition, the AICPA’s self-regulatory mechanisms in 
operation prior to the recent reforms will continue to operate. For instance, 
individual CPAs, including members of firms in the SEC Practice Section, 
will be subject to discipline by the Ethics Committee, and all CPAs will 
continue to be bound by the Code of Professional Ethics. The point is not 
the length of the list of regulatory mechanisms one could develop, but 
the effectiveness of the regulatory environment. I think with the addition 
of the SEC Practice Section, the overall system of regulation will provide 
the public with ample assurance with respect to the financial statements of 
SEC registrants.
******
The public accounting profession has been self-regulatory from its 
earliest days. Enhancements in self-regulation have been a regular feature 
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of the AICPA’s history. As we prepare for the future, it is clear the 
public expectations of CPAs have enormously increased. Though the public 
often forms its expectations without regard to costs, I believe that many 
of their expectations are legitimate and must be met. The AICPA recognizes 
that it must step up to this increased responsibility. I have just 
described, very briefly, the far-reaching measures the SEC Practice Section 
has taken to substantially increase its self-regulation of SEC Practice 
firms. These measures have been tremendously influenced by suggestions not 
only from practitioners, but also the SEC, your subcommittee, the late 
Senator Metcalf’s subcommittee, and others. I am certain that the SEC 
Practice Section, under the Public Oversight Board’s oversight, will 
operate effectively to protect the public interest and that no other form 
of regulation would better serve the public interest.
 


Statement of John J. McCloy before Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of House of Representatives 
held on Monday, January 30, 1978 at 2 P.M., Room 2322 
Raybum House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
I am a practicing lawyer, a member of the firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy located at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York City and I have been admitted to the bar of the State of New
York since 1921. I am also a member of the bar of the Supreme Court 
of the United States.
I have been asked by officials of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants whether I would be prepared to act as
Chairman of a Public Oversight Board of the S.E.C. Practice Section of 
the Institute's recently created Division of CPA Firms when such Board 
is constituted in accordance with the Institute's Plan for increased 
self regulation procedures.
I have been advised by such officials of the general 
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nature of the duties and responsibilities of such Oversight Board and
I have advised them that subject to its creation and its proper constitution
I would be prepared to act as the Chairman of such Board. I believe 
officials of the Institute have already testified before this Subcommittee 
in regard to the general nature, duties and responsibilities of the Board 
as well as proposals for increased self regulation.
I have had sustained experience in the general practice
of the law mainly in the corporate field extending over a large portion of 
my life. Prior to the outbreak of World War II I had been a member of 
the law firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, a predecessor 
firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. After periods in government service 
with the U.S. War Department as The Assistant Secretary of War during 
the World War II period and with the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development of the United Nations, sometimes known as the World
3
Bank,as its President and as U.S. Military Governor and as U.S. High
Commissioner to the Federal Republic of Germany, I served for over 7 
years as Chairman of the Board of The Chase Manhattan Bank in New
York City and its predecessor, The Chase National Bank. I returned to 
the active practice of law in 1961 and since that time have been engaged 
in such practice with my present firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy 
in New York. I have served on a number of boards of American 
corporations and institutions including the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Allied Chemical
Corporation, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Squibb Corporation, Dreyfus
Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, The Ford Foundation 
and the Rockefeller Foundation. I have also served on University and
College Boards of Trustees. I am Chairman Emeritus of the Board of
Trustees of Amherst College.
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I am not an accountant though I have been associated
with and have acted as a lawyer or an executive working in cooperation 
with accountants in connection with many corporate and financial 
transactions. In the course of my career and practice I have had a number 
of contacts with the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as with 
other regulatory agencies of the U.S. Government.
The Public Oversight Board has not yet been fully
constituted but I understand it is to be composed of five individuals who 
would be in a knowledgeable position to observe, evaluate and oversee 
the work of the Institute's S.E.C. Practice Section as it conducts its 
self regulatory functions. As it has been represented to me, the Board 
would be authorized to report at its own discretion any information, 
findings or recommendations based on its observance and oversight 
of the Practice Section to the Executive Committee of the Section, the
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Securities and Exchange Commission, appropriate Congressional Committees 
or to the public at large.
Though I am not in a position to devote all my time to the
office of Chairman of the Public Oversight Board, as I intend to continue 
the practice of my profession, I would be prepared to apply my best 
endeavors, together with the assistance of the other members of the
Board and a suitable staff, to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of 
the position of Chairman of the Board as they are contemplated by the
Institute.
In this position I would seek to contribute along with my
colleagues to the justified maintenance of confidence on the part of the 
investing public in the integrity and competence of the accounting 
profession in this country.


STATEMENT BY HARVEY KAPNICK, 
CHAIRMAN, ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO. 
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
95th CONGRESS, 2nd SESSION
JANUARY 30, 1978
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am 
grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today. My 
name is Harvey Kapnick. I am Chairman and Chief Executive 
of Arthur Andersen & Co., a worldwide organization of 
accountants and auditors.
I have previously testified before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs on May 24, 1977 on the 
subject under consideration in these hearings. My views on 
the reforms and corrective actions that the accounting 
profession needs to adopt were set forth in my testimony 
before the Senate Subcommittee and in a booklet which was 
placed in the record at that time.* I would appreciate 
having that booklet placed in the record of these hearings.
My general views remain as I stated them last May. 
Today, I would like to comment on what has been done in the 
last eight months and what needs to be done in the next 
eight months.
*”The Public Interest In Public Accounting" (With Commentary 
on the Metcalf and Moss Reports), Including Statement by 
Harvey Kapnick--Arthur Andersen & Co.--May 1977.
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The Public Interest
The capital markets of the United States are 
essential to the welfare of our society and to the operations 
of the entire world economy. If capital is to flow freely 
and efficiently in our free-enterprise economy, the consumers 
of financial information must continue to have full confidence 
in the product they receive. Independent auditors play a 
crucial role in maintaining this public confidence. The 
integrity, independence, objectivity, and professional 
quality of the work of auditors are critical to the success 
of our American economic system.
Public concern about the performance of independent 
auditors has been increasing, and I believe with some justi­
fication. If it is to serve the public interest the account­
ing profession must reform itself to meet increasing 
responsibilities and rising public expectations. At the 
same time, we must recognize that there are limits to the 
responsibilities that can be reasonably imposed on independent 
auditors.
While the accounting profession must continue to 
redefine its role, I do not believe, as some critics suggest, 
that public accounting will inevitably become a Federally 
regulated activity. Indeed, I believe that federal regula­
tion would destroy the character and, ironically, the 
usefulness of public accounting.
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Independence is essential to the auditor and to the 
crucial audit function--independence both from the pressures 
of clients and from the dictates of government. By performing 
a free, independent, and yet intermediary role between private 
enterprises and public markets, the auditor serves as a 
bulwark of our unique system of capitalism.
Legislation can neither create nor guarantee the 
accounting profession's independence -- quite to the contrary. 
The only effective means of assuring the profession’s indepen­
dence is its performance. The profession must demonstrate, 
in a clear and specific fashion, that its independence serves 
the public interest. This requires an increasing receptivity 
to fresh ideas as well as willingness to accept valid 
criticism and act on it.
Progress by the
Accounting Profession
Washington has criticized the accounting profession 
and thus helped move it toward overdue reform. There is no 
question but that, as a result of the incentive provided by 
your Subcommittee and the Senate Subcommittee, the profession 
has taken corrective actions it would not otherwise have 
taken.
When I testified before the Senate hearings last
May, I suggested that the AICPA be given until its annual 
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meeting in September 1977 to develop and adopt a comprehensive 
plan for self-regulation. To the dismay of some in my 
profession, I indicated that, if a plan could not be developed 
within that time, such a plan would never be developed. The 
issues were not new -- what was needed was a change in 
attitude and a willingness to act.
The AICPA developed a self-regulatory plan with 
unprecedented speed. That plan was approved at the organiza­
tion's annual meeting last September. Steps were immediately 
taken to implement the plan, and that process is continuing. 
Representatives of the AICPA have summarized for you what 
has been accomplished and what is planned for the future, so 
I will not repeat that information.
It is remarkable that the large and diverse account­
ing profession has made such progress in so short a time.
Yet much remains to be done. I have observed the accounting 
profession for many years and have sometimes been disappointed 
by its apparent unwillingness to do what seemed to be not 
only in the public interest but also in the long-range 
interest of the profession itself.
In recent months, however, I have seen significant 
evidence of a change in attitude and a willingness to act.
I sense a new desire on the part of leaders of the profession 
to recognize the full dimensions of their public responsibil­
ities and do what is needed to discharge them. For the 
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first time, most of the accounting firms have indicated a 
willingness to give up some of their autonomy in an effort 
to develop a meaningful system of professional self-regulation.
I would like to emphasize that the regulation of a 
profession, such as the accounting profession -- whether 
done by the profession Itself or by the government -- is 
vastly different from the regulation of business enterprises. 
This is particularly true with respect to the public account­
ing profession, which has a unique type of third-party 
responsibility and a vast array of professional standards.
I believe that the profession has earned the right 
to demonstrate whether it has the willingness, ability and 
determination to carry through with the present plans. 
Since the AICPA successfully worked against a deadline for 
the development of its plan, I would suggest that the AICPA 
again be challenged to work against a deadline -- its annual 
meeting in October 1978 -- to achieve basic implementation 
of the plan. If it has the will, the profession can meet 
that schedule.
I believe that the profession will succeed in 
achieving effective self-regulation because three new 
developments will build up increasing pressure for change.
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First, the Public Oversight Board of the new SEC 
Practice Section of the AICPA will be reviewing the public 
interest role of the profession and determining what is 
needed to meet that public interest.
Second, the Chairman of the SEC has promised to 
make an annual report to the Congress, beginning July 1, 
1978, which would review and analyze the progress of the 
profession and the Commission in meeting their responsibil­
ities. This is a constructive step which I endorse.
Third, as this hearing shows, there is a new 
awareness by the Congress. Periodic oversight by this 
Subcommittee and other Subcommittees will highlight areas 
which need to be considered. Thus, for the first time in 
the history of our profession, we have the appropriate 
structure to keep pace with our changing role.
I would like to briefly discuss what needs to be 
accomplished over the next eight months to bring about 
effective self-regulation by the profession.
What Needs to be Accomplished
Over the Next Eight Months
With respect to the AICPA Division of CPA Firms, 
I will discuss the SEC Practice Section more than the 
Private Companies Practice Section, not because the former 
is more important, but only because it relates to the 
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auditors of publicly owned companies which are covered by 
the Securities Acts and the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Certain provisions of the plan for the SEC Practice 
Section, such as those relating to second-partner review of 
audits, the rotation of audit partners, the requirements for 
continuing professional education, and the establishment of 
quality control standards, can be implemented within a 
reasonably short period of time.
There are, however, other key elements of the plan 
that are crucial to its success. These elements are:
1. Complete the appointment and organization of the 
Public Oversight Board, with adequate staff, and 
have that Board begin operations.
2. Establish the peer review program, as contemplated 
by the plan, and study alternative approaches that 
could be used in making the program more reliable.
3. Deal with questions relating to scope of practice 
of accounting firms and establish restrictions 
based upon the public interest.
4. Reconsider the need for a requirement that account­
ing firms publish financial information on an 
annual basis. This should include disclosure of 
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the way in which international firms are organized 
and financed.
5. Establish disciplinary machinery that can operate 
on a timely basis and without impairing the legal 
rights of firms and individuals.
6. Decide whether the profession can require audit 
committees as a condition of auditing a publicly 
held company.
While various matters are being considered in 
the Private Companies Practice Section, and while steps are 
being taken in other areas of the operations of the AICPA, 
I believe an appropriate disposition of these six items will 
be a test of the success or failure of the program. I am 
confident these objectives can be accomplished, and we should 
know whether the profession is willing to regulate itself 
by October 1978.
Some small firms are objecting to the SEC Practice 
Section on the ground that the prospective cost would be an 
undue burden. They are concerned about the cost of establish­
ing quality control standards, peer review, continuing 
professional education, etc. While I am sympathetic to the 
problems faced by small firms, I believe that, if such 
firms elect to audit publicly owned companies, the investors 
in those companies have a right to expect the accounting 
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firms involved, regardless of their size, to meet proper 
professional standards and to do the quality of work contem­
plated by the requirements of the SEC Practice Section.
The litigation recently initiated by small firms 
to delay the implementation of the program should not be 
permitted to halt progress toward necessary reforms. The 
public interest is too important to tolerate prolonged 
delay.
Various alternative methods of organization were 
considered before the present structure was adopted. A 
primary reason for adopting this structure was to attempt to 
fulfill our professional responsibilities to the public 
within the existing national professional organization (the 
AICPA) and thus keep a common "umbrella" over smaller firms 
to facilitate their growth, training and development. If, 
however, this approach is threatened with prolonged delay 
arising from the present litigation, we are quite willing to 
join with others in the profession to establish another 
independent but comparable organization restricted to firms 
auditing publicly held companies. Indeed, during the period 
of litigation, it would be prudent for such an alternative 
organizational concept to be developed. Thus, if a separate 
organization becomes necessary, no time would be lost in 
making the reforms needed to protect the public interest.
9
Our Firm Has Voluntarily
Taken Certain Actions
Arthur Andersen & Co. has voluntarily taken steps 
to better serve the public interest in many ways. We have 
issued annual reports for the last five fiscal years. These 
reports have included financial statements. For our last 
fiscal year, these financial statements were audited by 
another accounting firm.
For more than three years, we have also had a 
Public Review Board whose members are prominent persons with 
experience in the business, government, academic and profes­
sional communities. This Board conducts an independent 
review of the operations of our worldwide organization on a 
continuing basis, including the management and financing of 
the firm, the scope of our professional practice, and the 
control of the quality of our work. The results of this 
review are reported annually to the public.
In 1977, we had a peer review of our audit practice 
on a worldwide basis by another accounting firm. That firm 
reported the results to the Public Review Board and to our 
partners. The opinion of that firm with respect to our 
quality control procedures was included in our annual report.
We have voluntarily limited our firm's scope of 
practice to auditing, accounting, taxes, and administrative 
services, including the design and installation of systems
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(such as computer-based systems and procedures) and the 
performance of studies related to accounting, general record­
keeping, and control processes. We firmly believe that the 
knowledge and experience we acquire through our work in pro­
viding administrative services greatly enhance our effective­
ness as independent auditors. Moreover our combined skills 
and knowledge have a synergistic effect, resulting not only 
in better systems and controls to support the accounting 
process but also in audits of higher quality and lower cost. 
Accounting-oriented services are an essential part of the 
independent auditors' role and should be retained as appro­
priate areas for practice.
Further Comments 
On Several Issues
Now, permit me to comment briefly on several other 
issues facing the accounting profession.
Accounting standards. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board--with a new chairman and three new Board 
members, and with several significant changes in its policies 
and procedures--is entering a new stage of development and 
evolution. While I have criticized certain aspects of the 
FASB operations in the past, I fully support the FASB and 
believe it now has a new opportunity to be successful in 
carrying out its mission.
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Auditing standards. The accounting profession has 
been doing a steadily improving job of establishing auditing 
standards. To the best of my knowledge, most of the publicized 
cases involving alleged fraud have not revealed any deficiency 
in auditing standards. These cases have generally represented 
a failure to apply properly the existing standards.
Governmental imposition of auditing standards' 
would be unwise and unnecessary. It would, in fact, be 
counterproductive. Standards and procedures laid down by 
government decree would amount to a strait-jacket. This 
would inevitably inhibit the development of improved auditing 
techniques and methods. Government-enforced rules would 
tend to become minimum standards and would result in the 
deterioration of auditing quality rather than its improvement.
If the accounting profession is to be held responsible 
for its auditing performance, it should have the authority 
to establish its general standards and guidelines through 
its professional organization. Auditing firms then have the 
clear responsibility for professional performance that meets 
those standards.
Ethical standards. The rules of professional 
conduct should be reviewed to determine which can be demonstrated 
to be in the public interest and which cannot. The latter 
should be eliminated. Examples of rules that are being 
critically reconsidered are those against advertising, 
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solicitation, encroachment, and offering employment to an 
employee of another accounting firm without first informing 
that firm. Small firms may suffer more from these restrictive 
rules than do large firms. Arthur Andersen & Co. believes 
competition for clients and personnel serves the. public 
interest. Over the years, some in the profession have 
argued that restrictions on various types of competition 
would improve the quality of performance. I believe this 
viewpoint is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to sustain.
The most valuable asset of Arthur Andersen & Co. 
is the firm’s good name and reputation, which we work to 
protect and enhance every day. Our awareness of this reality 
serves as a powerful incentive to self-discipline in maintaining 
the highest quality of performance.
In the area of professional discipline, the AICPA 
must determine how it can become more effective. However, 
quite apart from professional sanctions it should be noted 
that lawsuits, SEC enforcement actions, high liability 
insurance premiums, and adverse publicity are powerful 
incentives for accounting firms to provide a high quality of 
service. Professional discipline is a difficult issue, 
since the legal rights of individuals are involved. A 
professional group cannot take away an individual’s livelihood 
without the full panoply of constitutional protection.
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Although all of us recognize the need for reform in this 
area, it is very complex from a legal point of view. There­
fore, this is an area that the Public Oversight Board should 
consider carefully and suggest how best to proceed.
Maintaining a viable accounting profession with 
firms of various sizes. Our firm has long taken the position 
that the accounting profession should be made up of a wide 
range of types and sizes of qualified accounting firms to 
serve the hundreds of thousands of business, nonprofit and 
governmental entities throughout the country. We have 
assisted smaller firms in various ways when they have asked 
us to help them. On the other hand, there is a need for 
healthy and constructive competition whereby professionals 
who do the best work are rewarded by success.
The continuation or establishment of artificial 
barriers to protect accounting firms from competition does 
not serve the public interest and only tends to reward the 
less efficient and less qualified. What is needed, as has 
been pointed out by the Public Review Board of our firm, is 
to find ways to assist accounting firms, particularly the 
smaller ones, in maintaining their qualifications and 
efficiency so that they can compete successfully in their 
own way and in their own area of practice.
Toward this end, our firm has recently made a 
$75,000 grant to the Paton Accounting Center at The University 
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of Michigan for research to identify the actions needed to 
assure the existence of public accounting firms of varying 
sizes and characteristics. Consideration will be given to 
the roles that the larger firms, the AICPA, the universities 
and colleges, and other existing or potential organizations 
might play.
International operations of larger accounting 
firms. One important issue has not received adequate atten­
tion by the accounting profession or by the SEC; it is the 
issue of accountability within an international framework. 
How do accounting firms control the auditing of the financial 
statements of subsidiaries that are Included in the consoli­
dated financial statements of U.S. parent companies upon 
which the auditors report? A peer review of only U.S. 
offices is not adequate for an accounting firm when significant 
audit work for U.S. clients is done on subsidiaries outside 
the United States.
The neglected question of firm structure needs 
to be studied. The critical issues of professional account­
ability and independence depend on whether an international 
firm's declared standards can actually be enforced and made 
effective. And this in turn depends on the firm's organiza­
tional structure and degree of managerial and financial 
integration.
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A wide variety of arrangements and affiliations 
exist in foreign countries among accounting firms, with 
considerably different degrees of control and review of the 
work performed outside the United States. Alternative 
approaches may be appropriate, but disclosure of how firms 
are structured, managed and financed is essential for the 
information of clients and for the public interest that is 
being served.
Our firm has a worldwide organization which adheres 
to uniform standards and objectives of professional leadership 
and client service. While complying with the laws, regulations 
and professional ethics of each country in which we practice, 
Arthur Andersen & Co. is truly transnational in structure and 
character. We have a large worldwide headquarters organiza­
tion to coordinate the activities of our national entities 
to ensure compliance with such standards. In addition, all 
members of the worldwide organization are financially and 
economically integrated to assure our independence.
In those few instances of countries where we cannot 
legally practice, we have arrangements with local firms. 
With respect to such local firms, we seek agreement on the 
standards to be followed, and we make reviews of their work. 
However, since we have no management relationship or financial 
integration with those firms, they are not represented as 
being part of our worldwide organization.
16
Audit Committees
A strong board of directors, with an audit committee 
composed of independent outside directors, is essential in 
today’s corporate environment. There is a trend toward the 
establishment of audit committees for publicly owned companies. 
Domestic companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
will be required to have audit committees by mid-1978.
For some time, our firm has believed that all pub­
licly owned companies should have audit committees composed 
of outside directors. We published a booklet in 1972 covering 
the functions of such committees.
In my testimony before the Senate Subcommittee, I 
suggested that the AICPA should promulgate a professional 
standard. That standard would require, as a condition for 
accepting an audit engagement for a publicly owned company, 
that the company establish an audit committee of outside 
directors. We believe this approach would be more successful 
than a Federal law or regulation requiring audit committees. 
Such Federal requirements would inevitably lead to further 
laws and regulations concerning the duties and responsibilities 
of directors and other corporate matters.
The AICPA has appointed a special committee to study 
ways to establish a professional standard concerning audit 
committees.
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Limited Liability
In recent years, the burden of litigation on inde­
pendent auditors has grown enormously, along with a vast 
increase in class action lawsuits, some of which have little, 
if any, merit. There is debate about the desirability of 
setting limitations on the liability of independent auditors. 
The solution to this problem lies in clarification of the 
criteria for determining the legal liability of auditors. 
This hopefully will come from a reasonable evolution of court 
decisions.
Some leaders of the accounting profession have been 
tempted to seriously consider the voluntary acceptance of 
Federal government regulation of the accounting profession 
in exchange for limitations on auditors’ liability. I cate­
gorically reject any such "deal.” Such a move cannot be 
justified as being in the public interest.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe the accounting profession 
has made considerable progress in the last year. I am confi­
dent that the present momentum will be maintained and more 
progress will be made. The Congress has performed a valuable 
service -- both to the public and the profession -- by putting 
the spotlight on needed reforms and changes. So far, I am 
proud to say, the profession is responding to the challenge 
of change. 18
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Eli Mason - I appreciate this opportunity 
to appear before you this morning. My professional quali­
fications INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
I AM A FORMER. VICE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE 
of Certified Public Accountants and a former member of its 
Executive Committee (now the Board of Directors).
I HAVE SERVED ON THE COUNCIL OF THE AICPA FOR NINE YEARS 
AND WAS ELECTED ON THREE OCCASIONS.
I AM A FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY 
of Certified Public Accountants, the largest of the State 
Societies with over 22,000 members.
I am a member of the New York State Board for Public 
Accountancy, the official state examining and licensing 
authority.
I am Chairman of the Board of Advisors of Baruch College, 
City University of New York, one of the largest schools of 
business in the United States.
I am Vice Chairman of CPA Associates, an association of 
37 INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTING FIRMS WITH OFFICES IN OVER 50 
United States and foreign cities.
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I AM MANAGING PARTNER OF MASON & COMPANY/ AN ACCOUNTING 
FIRM BASED IN NEW YORK CITY.
Mr. Chairman, during July 1975, an article which I wrote 
ENTITLED, "A PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING OUR PROFESSION" WAS 
PUBLISHED IN THE CPA JOURNAL. THE OPENING SENTENCE WAS, 
"The public accounting profession in the United States is 
in need of a vast restructuring." Subsequent events have 
proven the validity of that statement.
The thrust of the article was that the proliferation 
of authorities, rules and regulations created an accounting 
structure that was obsolete, inefficient and duplicative. 
The situation is aggravated by the existence of 54 state 
BOARDS OF ACCOUNTANCY WHICH OPERATE UNDER DIVERSE STATE 
STATUTES, HAVE DIFFERENT POWERS, DIFFERENT TERMS OF OFFICE 
AND PROMULGATE DIFFERENT RULES AND STANDARDS.
The practice of public accountancy is not a provincial 
VOCATION; RATHER, IT IS A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRO­
FESSION. Many, if not the vast majority of practicing pub­
lic accountants, deal with rules and regulations promulgated 
by the Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Defense Department, Department of Labor, etc.
In other words, most of us who practice public 
accountancy are practicing on the national scene.
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In my article, and subsequently, I ADVOCATED a national 
CPA CERTIFICATE WHICH WOULD PERMIT A CPA TO PRACTICE IN 
ANY STATE, TERRITORY OR SUBDIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES 
WITHOUT ARTIFICIAL WORK PERMITS, RECIPROCAL CERTIFICATES, 
AND INDEED, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE FOR PRAC­
TICING IN A STATE WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY.
Mr. Chairman, I have been advised by eminent legal 
COUNSEL THAT THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE 
United States Constitution is pervasive and, with respect 
TO THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY, WOULD PREVAIL OVER 
THE POLICE POWER PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. I THOUGHT 
THEN AND I THINK NOW THAT MY PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL CPA 
CERTIFICATE WAS A FINE IDEA - BUT THE HIERARCHY OF THE 
PROFESSION OPPOSED MY PLAN. I WONDER WHY! DOES THE ESTAB­
LISHMENT PREFER THE PRESENT DIFFUSED STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH 
RESULTS IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY BY THOSE WHO 
HAVE THE TIME AND RESOURCES?
Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the matter of practice by 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM­
MISSION. AS YOU KNOW, THOSE OF US WHO PRACTICE BEFORE THE 
Internal Revenue Service must meet requirements as set forth 
in Circular 230 of the U.S. Treasury Department. However, 
I KNOW OF NO SPECIFIC REGULATIONS WHICH SET FORTH QUALIFI­
CATIONS FOR PRACTICE BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE
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Securities and Exchange Commission,
It is conceivable that an unlicensed person who terms 
HIMSELF A "PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT", AND WHO MAY HAVE LITTLE OR 
NO EDUCATION, TRAINING, OR EXPERIENCE (AND THIS IS AND HAS 
BEEN POSSIBLE IN SO-CALLED "PERMISSIVE" STATES) COULD PRAC­
TICE BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Congress of the 
United States enact legislation which would provide for 
registration of public accountants to practice before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. I recommend that the 
legislation spell out the authorities of the SEC as to 
AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRAC­
TICE AS A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT BEFORE THE SEC AND RULES OF 
CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
WHO PRACTICE BEFORE THE SEC.
Mr. Chairman, as I am sure you know, there is no ques­
tion THAT THE SEC PRESENTLY HAS THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE 
AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS 
AGAINST ACCOUNTING FIRMS. I KNOW THAT WHEN THIS FACT IS 
REITERATED IT SENDS SHIVERS UP SOME SPINES - BUT IT IS TRUE, 
ABSOLUTELY TRUE.
Why do I advocate federal legislation to register public
ACCOUNTANTS WHO PRACTICE BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
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Commission? I do so for the following reasons:
1. Some state laws inhibit free and democratic practice 
BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
Commission.
For example, if a Massachusetts CPA is retained by a 
PUBLIC CORPORATION WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED AND OPERATES IN 
the State of Connecticut, he cannot freely perform the audit 
OF THE REGISTRANT IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT ON A CONTIN­
UING BASIS. If HE DID CONDUCT THE AUDIT, AS A MASSACHUSETTS 
CPA, HE COULD BE FINED UP TO $500 AND IMPRISONED FOR NO 
MORE THAN ONE YEAR.
IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT A LICENSED CPA CANNOT AUDIT ANY 
PUBLICLY-HELD CORPORATION ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES. 
There are a myriad of divergent state rules for reciprocity, 
ENDORSEMENT, WORK PERMITS, ETC., WHICH IMPEDE THE FREE PRAC­
TICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY ON A NATIONAL SCALE BEFORE THE 
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The impact of such restrictive barriers has an obvious 
detrimental effect on smaller and medium-sized accounting 
FIRMS WHICH CANNOT MAINTAIN OFFICES IN MANY STATES.
Another interesting restriction which may involve prac­
tice BEFORE THE SEC IN MUNICIPAL AUDITS IS A REQUIREMENT IN 
AT LEAST ONE STATE THAT ONLY A REGISTERED MUNICIPAL AcCOUN-
-5-
TANT COULD AUDIT A MUNICIPALITY. A CERTIFIED PUBLIC AC­
COUNTANT who is not a Registered Municipal Accountant can­
not LEGALLY AUDIT A MUNICIPALITY IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.
Imagine, if you will, the confusion that might arise 
IN SUCH A STATE IF THE SEC WERE TO SET FORTH RULES AND RE­
QUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL AUDITS.
2. A SECOND AND FUNDAMENTAL REASON FOR DESIRING FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION FOR PRACTICE BY PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS BEFORE THE 
SEC IS THE TRADITIONAL RECORD OF EVENHANDEDNESS BY THE STAFF 
OF THE SEC, AND IN PARTICULAR, THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
Accountant. For years, smaller and medium-sized accounting 
FIRMS HAVE VISITED AND CONFERRED WITH THE STAFFS OF THE 
Chief Accountant of the SEC and they have received a warm 
WELCOME, GRACIOUS COOPERATION AND COUNSEL. THIS POLICY IS 
TO BE CONTRASTED WITH THE RECORD OF THE PROFESSION ITSELF, 
WHERE DISPLACEMENT OF LOYAL LOCAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS, WHEN 
THEIR CLIENTS "GO PUBLIC", HAS BEEN THE RULE, RATHER THAN 
THE EXCEPTION.
One need only consider that 94% of the corporations 
LISTED ON THE New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE ARE AUDITED BY 8 FIRMS 
TO KNOW THAT THE TREND IS IN ONE DIRECTION. RECENT NEWS­
PAPER ACCOUNTS OF CHANGES IN AUDITORS INDICATE THAT BIG 8 
FIRMS USUALLY LOSE IMPORTANT CLIENTS TO OTHER BIG 8 FIRMS.
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However, the next tier of accounting firms usually lose 
THEIR CLIENTS TO BIG 8 FIRMS - WITH NO EVEN EXCHANGE.
In other words, Mr. Chairman, I think that the majority 
OF ACCOUNTING FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER AN 
EVEN BREAK FROM THE SEC COMPARED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION 
SPAWNED OVER THE YEARS BY THE PROFESSION'S INSTITUTIONS.
3. On September 17, 1977, the Council of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants approved a Division 
of Firms with an SEC Companies Practice Section and a Private 
Companies Practice Section. 18 members from 11 states in­
cluding two former AICPA Vice Presidents, four past and 
current AICPA Council members and managing partners of me­
dium-sized AND REGIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS COMMENCED A PRO­
CEEDING in New York State Supreme Court claiming that the 
INSTITUTION OF A DIVISION OF FIRMS WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE IT 
DID NOT CONFORM TO THE BYLAWS OF THE AICPA AND REQUIRED 
APPROVAL OF THE MEMBERSHIP BY A MAIL BALLOT.
Aside from the legal issue involved, those of us who 
OBJECT TO THE DIVISION OF FIRMS WITH TWO SECTIONS HAD CER­
TAIN SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS.
First, the guidelines of each section provide for an 
Executive Committee. In the case of the SEC Companies 
Practice Section, all accounting firms with over 30 publicly-
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HELD CLIENTS (12G), ARE AUTOMATICALLY ON THE EXECUTIVE 
Committee. Mr. Chairman, there are 21 firms on the 
Executive Committee, of which 16 are the largest in the 
United States. What chance would a smaller or medium- 
sized FIRM HAVE TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL IMPACT ON SUCH AN 
Executive Committee?
Mr. Chairman, the guidelines also provide for stan­
dards of peer review and mandatory continuing education.
I CANNOT EXPRESS AN OPINION THAT WOULD APPROACH YOUR 
INCISIVE EVALUATION OF CERTAIN PEER REVIEWS THAT ARE DEEMED 
ACCEPTABLE.
Another cosmetic element that the AICPA espouses is 
MANDATORY CONTINUING EDUCATION. THE INSTITUTE HAS ADOPTED 
A POLICY OF 40 HOURS PER ANNUM OF REQUIRED CONTINUING ED­
UCATION FOR RELICENSURE OF A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, you have 
BEFORE YOU AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN AICPA SPONSORED CONTINUING 
EDUCATION COURSE ENTITLED "MANAGEMENT FOR RESULTS." By 
ATTENDING THIS SEMINAR, ON THIS IMPORTANT ACCOUNTING TOPIC, 
AT SUCH GREAT CENTERS OF LEARNING AS LAKE TAHOE, VAIL, 
Hyannis and Miami, one can fulfill the annual AICPA contin­
uing EDUCATION REQUIREMENT. INCIDENTALLY, NEITHER OF THE 
INSTRUCTORS IS AN ACCOUNTANT!
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In addition, Mr. Chairman, there are many AICPA members 
WHO BELIEVE THAT THE DIVISION OF FIRMS SETS UP A TWO-CLASS 
SYSTEM. OF COURSE, IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT ANYONE CAN JOIN 
the SEC Companies Practice Section, but Mr. Chairman, who 
WANTS TO PLAY THE GAME IF NO ONE WILL EVER THROW YOU THE 
BALL?
Mr. Chairman, we believe that the new Division of Firms 
SETS UP AN ELITIST CLASS, WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MANY 
MEMBERS OF THE AICPA. It IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE BIG 8 
FIRMS INSIST ON SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND AUTHORITY. INDEED, 
IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT THE BIG 8 HAVE A "DE FACTO VETO" 
OVER ACTIONS OF THE AICPA. If THAT BE THE CASE, Mr. CHAIRMAN 
WE PREFER THE FUTURE PROSPECT OF REGULATION BY THE SEC TO 
THE PAST RECORD OF THE AICPA.
In the final analysis. Congress and the SEC must assume
THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Mr. Chairman, I recommend that legislation be enacted
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, FOR THE FOLLOWING:
1. A Federal Registry of Public Accountants authorized to 
PRACTICE BEFORE THE SEC.
2. All public accountants who are licensed and in good 
STANDING BEFORE A STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY AND THE SEC
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MAY REGISTER TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE SEC.
3. Firms of accountants who are licensed or registered by 
a State Board of Accountancy and who are in good standing 
BEFORE SAID STATE BOARD AND THE SEC MAY REGISTER TO PRAC­
TICE BEFORE THE SEC.  
A. A Certificate of Registration shall be issued to each 
ACCOUNTANT AND ACCOUNTING FIRM AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE BE­
FORE THE SEC AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO RENEWAL EVERY THREE 
YEARS.
5. The Certificate of Registration shall authorize the 
REGISTERED ACCOUNTANT AND/OR ACCOUNTING FIRM TO PRACTICE 
BEFORE THE SEC IN ANY STATE, TERRITORY OR SUBDIVISION OF 
the United States.
6. No STATE OR AGENCY THEREOF MAY INTERFERE WITH A REGIS­
TERED ACCOUNTANT OR ACCOUNTING FIRM WHO IS ENGAGED IN THE 
CONDUCT OF AN AUDIT PURSUANT TO SECURITIES LAWS OF THE 
United States, and rules and regulations thereunder.
7. Registered accountants or accounting firms shall be sub­
ject TO ALL STANDARDS, RULES AND CODES PROMULGATED BY THE 
SEC.
8. The SEC, after application of due process procedures,
SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE THE REGISTRA-
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TION OF AN ACCOUNTANT OR ACCOUNTING FIRM.
9. The SEC shall enunciate standards for peer review which
SHALL BE FAIR, EQUITABLE AND MEANINGFUL.
Naturally, the foregoing recommendations are subject 
TO SPECIFICITY and amplification.
Mr. Chairman, the time for action is now. Please do 
NOT BE MISLED BY THE APPEALS FOR TIME FOR SELF-REGULATION. 
In 1975, when we discussed restructure, there were those 
WHO HOPED THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD DISAPPEAR. BUT THE PROB­
LEM DID NOT DISAPPEAR. SENATOR METCALF AND REPRESENTATIVE MOSS 
SAW TO THAT.
NOW, THEY ARE HOPING, ONCE AGAIN, THAT THE PROBLEM WILL 
GO AWAY. YOU MUST NOT PERMIT THE NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC AND 
A VERY LARGE SEGMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRACTITIONERS TO BE 
SHUNTED ASIDE.
Mr. Chairman, forgive me for a personal reference. Many 
PRACTITIONERS ASK ME WHY AT THIS STAGE OF MY PROFESSIONAL 
CAREER, I RUN THE RISK OF BEING CALLED A GADFLY OR DISSENTOR. 
As A RATHER SUCCESSFUL PRACTITIONER, I HAVE ASKED MYSELF 
THE SAME QUESTION AND THE ANSWER ALWAYS IS, "SOMEONE HAS TO 
DO IT."
Thank you.
-11-

To the
Congress of the United States 
House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on oversight and investigations 
of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Prepared by
Joseph P. Alam, CPA 
Alam & Company 
Certified Public Accountants
Detroit, Michigan
My name is Joseph P. Alam. I am a certified public accountant 
practicing in Detroit, Michigan. I attended the University of 
Detroit and graduated in 1960 with a B.S. in accounting. Upon 
completion of my full time military obligations I began employ­
ment with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company. In 1963 I received 
my CPA certificate and in 1964 founded the firm which was the pred­
ecessor of Alam & Company.
My first exposure to the bias in favor of the big eight accounting 
firms occurred while still attending college. I will never forget 
our auditing instructor, a former partner in a national firm, 
solemnly intoning to the assembled students that the signature of 
a big eight accounting firm on a financial statement was like 
the word sterling engraved on silver. Well, he and other 
instructors did their job well. By graduation time we were 
convinced that if we didn’t obtain employment with one of these 
firms we had already failed. Imagine that. Before our first 
day on the job we would be considered failures in our own eyes and 
in the eyes of our fellow graduates. I was too unsophisticated 
in those days to recognize the unhealthy relationship that fre­
quently exists between these firms and the educational community. 
What would a student know about fees paid for research projects, 
part time and summer employment, fees paid to educators for 
staff development courses and staff training assistance? What 
did I know about the flood of accounting literature which covers 
the desks and shelves of every accounting instructor’s desk all 
provided by the big eight firms? Nothing back then, nothing at all.
While at Peat, Marwick I learned several lessons. First of all 
I found out that what we learned at the firms very excellent 
staff training schools had little applicability if it conflicted 
with one of the firms two gods ’’The Time Budget”. Woe the poor 
young man who exceeded his budget, on him the wrath of the firm 
would fall. This led to the belief that this year’s audit should 
just be a copy of the previous year’s. Why take a fresh look, 
instead take the safe route.
But there was a way to make the partners happy. Pay allegiance 
to the second of the firms two gods, "Practice Development". 
Join the Jaycees, be active. Work hard at bringing in new clients. 
Then all would be well.
Little did I realize in those days the implications for the 
business community this emphasis on these two areas of practice.
FIRM PROFITABILITY
FIRM GROWTH
Let me detail specific problems encountered by small practitioners 
as a result of the activities of the major accounting firms.
The large accounting firms have come to control our largest 
professional organizations. Amongst practitioners, members of 
the national accounting firms, members of local accounting firms 
and members in industry or education very little disagreement 
exists on this point.
The only debate focuses around the benefits, advantages, dis­
advantages and inevitability of this control. I refer you to 
question six of the survey entitled What accountants think about 
the Metcalf Report as published by the Practical Accountant, one 
of the major publications serving our profession in its November, 
December, 1977 issue, a copy of which is attached (EXHIBIT). What 
are the practical affects of this control on the small firm? 
They are many and far reaching. It is extremely difficult for 
local practitioners to obtain positions on important AICPA 
committees. Each year the Institute mails our firm a listing 
of its committees, the anticipated time requirement for its 
activities and an idea of what travel is necessary. Each year 
my partners and I have carefully reviewed this listing, discussed 
our obligations to other organizations and indicated our willing­
ness and ability to perform. Never have we received even the 
courtesy of a reply. I have talked to many other practitioners 
who have had exactly the same experience. AICPA employees have 
informed me that such appointments are made upon the recommendation 
of the state societies. I have been assured by the Executive 
director of the Michigan Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (MACPA) that at least in our state such is not the 
case. After directing the question to two full time staff 
members of the Institute, the executive director of MACPA and 
numerous local practitioners I still have only a vague idea how 
some committee members are selected. What are the reasons given 
by the Institute for limiting involvement of local firm members? 
First of all there are just too many members and too few 
committee appointments. My answer to that is simple. The large 
firms seem to have no difficulty in obtaining the appointments 
they want. Secondly, and this is the answer offered most 
frequently, small firms cannot afford the time and cost required 
to serve effectively. We receive time and travel estimates from 
the AICPA, make our committments and someone somewhere decides 
we cannot afford to participate! Well I guess they know more 
about our financial position than we do. Isn't that really the 
only possible logical explanation. Lastly, we hear about the 
problems of geography. How can a firm in California serve when 
the Institute is located in New York. Another bogey man. Why 
must or should committee meetings be held in New York. I suspect 
that a good number of them are not. If geography is really a 
problem the Institute should decentralize. After all we are not 
here to serve the AICPA, it exists to serve the membership.
The large firms have effectively used the AICPAs rules on adver­
tising to pirate away the clients of local practitioners. Perhaps 
the most damaging technique used in our area has been the centrally 
prepared educational seminar. Our clients are freely solicited 
to attend canned programs put out by national firms to see how 
the industry "experts" do it. Many small firms are just as 
knowledgeable, just as expert, but the cost of assembling these 
programs for a once or twice presentation is prohibitive. Only 
the big firms with their ability to use these programs over 
and over again in city after city can afford their cost.
At one such seminar which we attended under client auspices the 
presentor was freely distributing literature bearing its name and 
describing the many benefits to be derived from the use of its 
computor programs. Our letter of complaint directed to the 
Institute went unanswered. The practical effect of these seminars 
has been to circumvent the Institutes rules on advertising, rules 
which prevent the local practitioner from holding himself out 
as a specialist, even if he is one. The damage done to local 
firms has been incalculable.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of domination has occurred 
as a result of the hearings conducted by this subcommittee and 
that chaired by the late Senator Metcalf. The Institute response 
has been a careful, well orchestrated, one-sided defense of the 
position of the national accounting firms. No where in our 
professional publications or in the national press can you find 
the Institute dealing with the kinds of serious problems smaller 
firms agree exist within the accounting profession. Rather staff 
members deny or attempt to explain away the problems of 
domination or undue concentration of services. Local prac­
titioners did not have any meaningful role in formulating a 
response to the complaints lodged against our profession. I 
believe the AICPA has forfeited any claim to represent local 
practitioners.
Attached as exhibit B is a copy of the AICPA brochure entitled Voluntary 
Quality Control Review Program for CPA Firms. It deals in a 
meaningful way with many of the problems of smaller CPA firms. 
It ignores entirely the management problems of the large firms.
UNREALISTIC GROWTH OBJECTIVES, AND UNREALISTIC PROFIT OBJECTIVES
The real abuses that have plagued our profession did not result 
from incompetency, lack of proper training programs, etc. 
Rather they have resulted from the pressure cooker atmosphere 
that big firm partners work in. These people risk their entire 
career if they lose a major client. If the managing partner 
of a local office cannot expand his office in accordance with 
policy dictated by the home office, he is replaced. The pressure 
on these individuals is obvious. In Detroit we see a constant 
parade of partners being brought in from other parts of the 
country to run the local offices. Why? Can’t we develop 
indigenous partners. The answer is simple. New York partners 
do not understand the very cylinical nature of our essentially 
static market area. Consequently they are unwilling to accept 
the nature of growth in the Metropolitan area. If the national 
firms set growth objectives of between 10%-20% per year and are 
willing to commit the time and money to accomplish these 
objectives - just whose clients are they going to take? And 
just what chance is there of achieving these goals if a good 
client is lost? The large firms make the argument that small 
firms can easily lose their independence as a result of a loss 
of a major client. In fact the truth is just the opposite. 
Once you accept the fact that firms are made up of people not
partners you can understand how the large firms get into the 
type of messes which have been so frequently highlighted in 
the financial press, and which have necessitated the hearings 
of this subcommittee and that of the late Senator Metcalf.
Fee pressures are a constant problem in public accounting.
Client management is understandably reluctant to give outside 
auditors, or anyone for that matter, a blank check on their 
account. This is particularly true in periods when earnings 
are depressed or even non-existant. Yet these are the very 
times when management is most likely to attempt to manipulate 
earnings. This conflict is obvious-an attempt by management 
to reduce its cost and a possible need to expand auditing 
procedures. Quality vs Profit. Where does the large firm put 
its emphasis. Theoretically on the side of quality, but every 
audit partner, every managing partner knows that the reality 
is that his future rests not on the very difficult to ascertain 
subjective standard of quality, but rather on the easily quantifyable, 
objectively determinable standard of profitability. I do not 
suggest this conflict can be easily resolved. I do suggest that 
the emphasis on time budgets is badly overdone.
As a result of the well financed practice expansion programs 
of the national accounting firms an unhealthy degree of 
concentration has come to exist within our profession. Once 
again I wish to point out the disservice the AICPA has done 
the majority of its members by attempting to explain away in 
an oversimplistic manner the problem of concentration. 
CPA firms are unique for just one reason, only 
they can issue an opinion on financial statements. All other 
services offered by our profession are offered by others, ie 
tax return preparers, law firms, management consultants, book­
keeping services, etc. So there is really only one reason for 
CPA firms to exist, to issue an opinion on financial statements. 
But are we all, in fact, really able to do so? Theoretically yes. 
If you have your license from the state board and have main­
tained your good standing. But look at why auditors are 
engaged? In most cases some outside party requires that 
statements be certified. Who? In most cases the government, 
a lending institution or an underwriter. What has actually 
happened is that outside third parties have usurped the 
authority of the state to determine who can or cannot issue 
an opinion on financial statements. They have a kind of 
veto power over whose signature is acceptable and whose is not. 
The large accounting firms recognized this early in the game 
and carefully orchestrated their capability as specialists 
to all who would listen. The results have been disastrous 
to small firms. Underwriters began to insist that big eight firms 
be employed before they would agree to handle offerings of 
securities to the public. The results are well known.
Almost all publicly held companies are audited by large 
accounting firms. I predict that unless this subcommittee or 
some government agency intercedes on the behalf of the smaller 
firms it is only a matter of time before all this work is 
performed by the large firms. It strikes me as wrong that our 
government’s efforts to protect the investing public has been 
used as an excuse to expand the practice of a few large firms, 
to create an oligopolistic structure within our profession. 
Mind you this trend is not over. Almost every company which 
experiences a degree of success must have access to the public 
money markets. Must they inevitably employ large firm auditors? 
Why? For marketing purposes' One of the few areas of audit 
practice in which smaller firms have been able to maintain a 
presence is in the audit of municipalities. We have been able 
to do so because many local ordinances require that multiple 
bids be solicited and that the low bid be accepted. The 
widely publicized financial plight of many cities has created a 
demand by the underwriters of municipal bonds that future 
prospectises contain audited financial statements. This is as 
it should be. Investors have a right to be informed. Does this 
mean the role of the small firm as municipal auditor is coming 
to an end. Only time will tell, but I suspect so. Think about 
the structure of the securities industry, the disappearance 
from the scene of the many small local underwriting firms and 
the increasingly important role of a few giant New York based 
underwriters. I’m afraid that under todays systems, the system 
fostered by and defended by the AICPA, its rules, regulations, 
and structure, the future for many small, fine CPA firms is 
predictable. They will not survive in their present form. Let’s 
look at the recent division of firms. What does it actually 
accomplish except to institutionalize and protect the position 
of a few large firms. Alam & Company has three clients which are 
subject to the reporting requirement of the SEC. We have a 
staff of 17 professionals 8 of whom are Certified Public 
Accountants. We have two technical partners, an audit partner, 
and a tax partner. One of the requirements for membership in 
the SEC Section is for the rotation of audit partners. How 
does a small firm rotate audit partners when you have but one. 
Further, this requirement has little affect on the large firms 
because the key man on the engagement is frequently not the 
partner. In all but the largest clients it is probably the audit mana, 
On some of the smaller clients it is probably an audit supervisor.
So as a practical matter it is likely that this requirement 
will have little effect on large firms. Their structure protects 
them. Often they have been retained in the first place at the 
insistence of third parties. They are not as dependent on 
personal relationships. In a small firm partners tend to be 
more involved in the actual audit work and to retain their 
clients because of personal contacts. It is obvious who will 
benefit from this rule. We have been told that relief will be 
offered for ’’hardship cases" on a one-by-one basis. Well, who 
wants to be a hardship case? Why not instead build in the 
protection small firms need. Once one understands the predatory 
nature of the large accounting firms the use of the 
client information the SEC Practice Section requires under 
section 3(g)(8) of the membership requirements becomes
suspect. Of what practical value is this information? It is 
not improbable that it will be summarized and distributed to 
the local offices as likely client acquisition prospects. When 
compared to other client acquisition techniques employed by 
the large firms this would be a rather innocuous procedure. 
The large firms defend the concentration of services within 
the SEC practice area with a couple of very transparent 
arguments. First of all they say that large companies require 
large audit firms. With the very largest companies that is 
probably true. But many companies perhaps most companies who 
have sold securities to the public are not giant international 
corporations. In the mid to late sixties and the early 
seventies large numbers of smaller companies ’’went public”. 
These companies are the logical market for the services of small 
accounting firms. They do not require nor can they afford to 
employ the more sophisticated talents of the big firms. But 
they do employ these firms - they must if they wish continued 
access to the public markets. In the last few years some 
recognizing that the advantages of employing a 
smaller firm outweighs the supposed value of access to an 
illusionary money market have started to drift back to the smaller 
firms. They should. They can get better service at a lower cost 
The division of firms as presently structured should effectively 
stop this outflow.
A second argument frequently employed is that only bigness 
can provide the level of expertise required to service clients 
subject to the reporting requirements of the SEC. They point 
to the level of spending required to prepare and disseminate 
information to keep their partners and staff aware of current 
developments. They ignore the availability of commercial 
reporting services such as Commerce Clearing House. They 
ignore the really excellent assistance available from SEC 
personnel. Do they contend that only they are qualified to 
represent clients in front of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Surely nothing can be more complex than the tax laws. Much of 
this money is spent in an attempt to overcome the communication 
problems created in a large centrally controlled multi-office firms. 
No, all it takes to develop the special knowledge required 
is the opportunity to work on a number of SEC clients. You 
must remember that there are few real differences in the audit 
of a publicly held or a privately owned company. Most of the 
differences are in the reporting area. A third argument advanced 
by the big firms is that of geography. They contend that 
clients with multi plant or office locations requires accounting 
firms with offices in many cities. Another bogy-man. Why? 
Most of these medium sized companies have centralized accounting 
departments. Their accounting is all done in one city. While there 
may be auditing steps which must be performed at each location 
they are relatively minor tasks (but none the less important) 
which can be performed by transferring staff on temporary 
assignment, by the use of correspondent firms or by some combin­
ation of these techniques, i.e. transfer of supervisory personnel 
and the use of correspondent firm lower level employees.
In my opinion none of these arguments can stand up under close 
examination.
While most of the discussion to date has focused around 
concentration within the SEC practice area, the problem is much 
more widespread. In most large American cities it is very 
difficult for a local CPA firm to obtain any referrals to clients 
who require an audit of their financial statements. Frankly, 
we must fight to keep what we have. In just the last year on 
two separate occasions we have been confronted with bank requests. 
for a big eight accounting firms. In one instance this requirement 
was written right into the loan agreement. This loan by the way 
was supported by a 90% guarantee of an agency of the U.S. Government. 
We did not get that client and the reason cited was the bank 
loan agreement. On another occasion a large client was 
attempting to increase his bank line. The institution he was 
working with was informed by the New York based bank that was 
considering the over line that a requirement of their partic­
ipation would be the retention of a big eight accounting firm. 
Fortunately some of my friends in New York were able to inter­
cede in our behalf and we retained the client. So you can see 
that concentration leads to further concentration. Let me list 
for you other industries completely dominated by the large firms.
Banks
Savings and loan associations
Broker-dealers
Hospitals and other health care institutions 
Retailers (other than mama-papa type stores)
These are all local markets which small firms are competent to 
serve. At the current time we are not able to do so. The reasons 
have to do with marketing, not capability.
In reviewing the similarities and differences between the SEC 
PRACTICE SECTION and the PRIVATE COMPANIES PRACTICE SECTION one 
is struck more by the similarities than the differences.
SEC 
Section
Private 
Companies 
Section
Eligibility for membership ALL FIRMS ALL FIRMS
Adherence to AICPA quality 
control standards YES YES
Peer review YES YES
Continuing Professional Education 
requirement 40 Hours 40 Hours
Partner rotation YES NO
Submit detailed information 
for public inspection YES NO
Maintain minimum amounts of 
professional liability insurance YES YES
Offer management advisory 
services (MAS) YES YES
Report MAS by client for SEC 
clients YES NO
Pay dues YES YES
Public Oversight Board MUST CAN
Sanctions against firms YES YES
Financing and staffing AICPA AICPA
There are some limitations on the type of, services that can be 
offered to SEC SECTION clients. After reviewing this list you 
might ask yourself why we are restructuring the entire profession 
,to accomplish such narrow ends. I cannot answer that question. 
There is some talk that the kind of reporting required by small 
clients differs from that required by large clients. That may or 
may not be the case. I submit Exhibit C, an article entitled 
The impact of FASB statements on small business by Marshall S. 
Armstrong, chairman of the FASB as published in the August, 1977 
issue of the Journal of Accountancy. It details some of the problems 
with that approach. Even if the position that two sets of report­
ing standards are required is accepted, most will apply to both 
kinds of companies. To date there are only a couple of areas 
that are being talked about namely earnings per share and seg­
ment reporting. This seems hardly enough reason to restructure 
a whole profession.
Another problem facing local firms is the practice known as 
’’buying in” on engagements. As described by a big eight partner 
at an MACPA seminar which I attended this practice involves 
bidding jobs in order to achieve market penetration rather than 
with the objective of making a profit. In a commercial enterprise 
other than a profession this would be forbidden as a predatory 
pricing practice. It is quite widespread and the reason for its 
use varies. Perhaps the CPA firm thinks the client has sig­
nificant use for services other than those being quoted. Maybe 
they want to sell additional tax and management advisory services 
but require a larger audit base in order to justify in house 
specialists. They "buy” the audit. Local firms cannot do business 
on that basis. We have no giant utilities or large multi national 
clients to subsidize the growth of specific segments of our 
practice. We must have the opportunity to make a profit on each 
piece of work we do. We cannot afford "loss leaders”. Attached 
as Exhibit D is a reprint of an article from The New York Times 
entitled How far should practice development go? I would like 
you to know that in our market area the price cutting goes much, 
much deeper than is alluded to in this article.
The audit committee presents a problem for small firms. All 
of us recognize the potential benefits to be derived by having 
non-management directors involved in the selection process. 
There are some doubts in my mind as to just how these directors 
can evaluate auditor performance without resorting to information 
provided by management. I suspect they cannot.
The danger to small firms is that audit committee members, in 
an attempt to put as much equity between themselves and possible 
litigation, will increasingly call for the appointment of big firm 
auditors. At least one big eight firm in our area is already 
capitalizing on this possibility. A seminar was offered to bank 
directors on the subject of directors' liability. It turned out 
to be primarily a pitch in favor of audit committees.
So they are a mixed blessing, undoubtedly good for the profession, 
but sure to be abused to the detriment of the smaller firms.
Well, where does all this lead. Frankly it is very unlikely that 
the AICPA or the large accounting firms are going to reform themselves. 
It is doubtful that they even see the need for reform. I am sure 
they would quarrel with much if not all we have presented here 
today. Unless the government is willing to take an activist 
role nothing will change. Let me offer some suggestions.
The Securities and Exchange Commission should issue guidelines 
to the broker-dealer community which it regulates either directly 
or through the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) 
detailing those circumstances under which a change of auditors 
can be requested, and providing damages to CPA firms for loss 
of clients due to inappropriate underwriter actions.
Audit committees should be provided with a listing of claims and 
lawsuits outstanding at the date of retention. Only with this 
information can they truly understand the financial position of 
the firm they are engaging. This listing should be comprehensive 
and not limited as currently anticipated by the SEC Practice Section.
The profession should lose whatever exemption it enjoys from the 
provisions of the anti-trust laws. Predatory pricing should be 
specifically prohibited.
Other regulated industries, i.e. banks should be issued guidelines 
for requesting changes in customers' auditors. Provision should 
be made for damages to firms for changes requested for unauthor­
ized reasons.
Lastly and most importantly the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, it's committees, councils and boards and divisions 
should be opened up to all members. If this requires decentralization 
it should be decentralized. Only in this way can past abuses be 
corrected.
Thank you for this opportunity to present my views.

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF ALAN BROUT, CPA 
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 95th CONGRESS, 
SECOND SESSION
I am Alan Brout, the managing partner of Brout & Company. 
Brout & Company is the successor to a firm of certified public 
accountants established by my father in 1921. We have since that 
time earned a reputation, of which we are proud, for competence 
and integrity in the practice of our profession in the New York 
metropolitan area. In 1968 we opened an office in Los Angeles 
and this year an office in Morristown, New Jersey. The firm 
consists of 16 partners and a professional staff of about 100. 
We have approximately 15 clients who are subject to the reporting 
requirements of the SEC.
I, on behalf of my firm, am one of 18 members of the AICPA 
who brought an action early this month under Article 78 of the 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in the Supreme Court of the 
State of New York. The petition challenges the establishment by 
AICPA Council of a division of firms consisting of two sections, 
principally on the grounds that the act violates the AICPA bylaws. 
We contend that sectionalization, as promulgated, will severely 
restrict the abilities of smaller local and regional CPA firms to 
secure and retain audits of publicly held companies.
While it would be repetitious in view of the other statements 
presented to go into the background and reasoning which led us to 
take this route, I would like to emphasize several points. First, 
it seems ironic that the very attacks on the dominant power of the 
Big Eight in the AICPA have triggered a response by that organiza­
tion which can only make them more dominant in this crucial area 
of audit practice. We have only to look at the composition of the 
Executive Committee of the SEC practice section to see that large 
firm domination is assured in perpetuity. The Committee consists 
of 21 members. Any firm, regardless of competence or reputation 
is assured a seat if it audits 30 or more publicly held companies. 
Five seats are reserved for those auditing fewer than 30 such 
registrants. I believe that 16 firms were entitled to seats on 
the initial committee under the "30 or more" rule. The composition 
of the Committee is therefore fixed to the extent of 76% of its 
members. Presumably, there could be rotation in the other five 
places but appointments after the initial Executive Committee is 
established require approval of the then existing Executive 
Committee. It is hard to believe that dissenting views would 
obtain any representation under this stacked-deck situation.
Page 2
It is worth noting that the AICPA is soon to distribute a mail 
ballot to the AICPA membership. The members will be asked to amend 
the bylaws to permit 1) expanding the board of directors of the 
AICPA by adding three public members and 2) allowing non-practicing 
members to serve as officers of the Institute and members of the 
trial board. It was regarded as unnecessary to submit the major 
restructuring creating the division of firms to the membership at 
large. One cannot believe that this was engendered by any motiva­
tion other than a fear that such a vote on the two-section proposal 
would have been overwhelmingly negative. A second point with 
regard to our action is the feeling that whatever standards are 
ultimately adopted by the SEC practice section peer review committee 
will inevitably emphasize those standards applicable to the largest 
national and international firms which will necessitate detailed 
formal procedures required in a multi-office, multi-national 
operation. Smaller firms adopting such formalized standards will 
probably find themselves economically penalized and more reluctant 
to compete in this important area.
As late as January 4, I was told that approximately 1,050 firms 
had applied for the private firms section and 350 for the SEC 
practice section. Of those 350, 250 were currently serving no 
publicly held clients. They may have agreed to join the Section in 
the hope that they may be able to do some SEC work in the future. 
It is entirely possible that within our lifetime we might conceivably 
see a revival of the market for equities. Most CPA firms would not 
like to be foreclosed from serving their existing clientele if they 
ever reach the state of eligibility to raise equity capital through 
a public offering. Another reason for applying may be the gnawing 
fear that failure to belong to the SEC practice section would 
indicate to bankers, attorneys and potential clients that a firm 
failing to join was a little less qualified to render all the 
services that CPA firms generally offer.
In a letter to its members of August 23 the AICPA leadership 
answered a question on first-class and second-class distinctions 
with the phrase that "...the public is not likely to conclude that 
there are first- and second-class CPA’s unless we keep repeating 
that this is so." Nevertheless, I believe that, as a practical 
matter, any firm harboring the slightest hope of ever doing SEC work 
will join the SEC practice section which, as I previously indicated, 
is structurally designed to be perpetually dominated by the giants. 
While the communications concerning sectionalization have emphasized 
that membership is purely voluntary, I think everyone recognizes 
that for economic and competitive purposes it would be foolish for 
any firm seriously engaged in, or wanting to qualify for SEC work, 
to remain on the outside looking in. The sole reason for the 
"voluntary" label was to allow the AICPA to maintain the fiction 
that no bylaw amendment was required.
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In the event we prevail in our action, I believe it unlikely 
that the plan of the AICPA could be amended and submitted to its 
membership in a form which would be accepted by a majority of 
members. I myself could support a division of firms (without two 
sections) as long as that division reflected a more representative 
cross-section of the profession. It has been stated that the Big 
Eight might then decide to pull out of the AICPA and establish 
their own grouping. While I do not feel that such fragmentation 
would be in the public interest, I believe that the fragmentation 
resulting from the September 17 AICPA Council vote is even less so.
The petitioners who brought the action undoubtedly have varying 
views. A number of us believe that the AICPA may never be wholly 
effective in professional self-regulation. I personally feel that 
the SEC should have a more active role in determining the standards 
  of those privileged to practice before it. My own experience with
the SEC staff dates back over 20 years. There is no government 
agency with which I have come in contact that has exhibited a higher 
level of professionalism, competence and helpfulness than the SEC 
as represented by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office 
of Chief Accountant. They have been helpful to the less experienced 
practitioner and scrupulously fair in listening to opposing view­
points. I feel that small and medium-sized practitioners are 
welcomed by the SEC and that the Commission’s involvement in 
professional regulation would take such firms’ interests into 
account.
The subcommittee has asked me to comment on the advantages and 
disadvantages of audit committees for large and small firms. In 
view of Chairman Williams’ recent statements as well as the position 
of the New York Stock Exchange, the AICPA and both the Metcalf and 
Moss subcommittees, to say anything in opposition to audit committees 
could be construed as high treason. Certainly, in the case of larger 
publicly held companies, such as the Fortune 1,000, audit committees 
can prove to be a vital cog in the independence machinery. Neverthe­
less, I feel that in the smaller company, which typically went public 
in the '60’s and would probably prefer to be privately held today, 
the inability to obtain competent outside directors, the first step 
to an independent audit committee, will render them ineffective. Of 
our 15 publicly held clients, to date only five have established audit 
committees consisting of outside directors. My concern is that, as 
audit committees proliferate in smaller and medium-sized publicly 
held companies, there will be a gradual shift from smaller to larger 
firm auditors. Certainly, a member of an audit committee of a 
potential client, conscious of possible liabilities, might tend to 
choose affluence over competence. His decision in a marginal 
situation may be based on which firm has the deepest pocket to pay 
off potential claims in this litigious world. He might feel that 
it would be easier, two years down the road if placed on a witness 
stand, to defend a choice of Arthur Andersen rather than John Jones 
& Company whom no-one ever heard of.
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I have also some concern as to whether a less sophisticated 
audit committee, conscious of spending shareholders’ funds, might 
reflect the view that all audit reports read the same, include the 
identical two-paragraph opinion and that one might as well obtain 
the cheapest. Any firm has two hurdles to overcome — management 
which will probably make the initial selection and the audit 
committee which may or may not ratify that selection. To the extent 
audit committees are given an unrestricted right to select auditors 
without sufficient management influence, the task of the smaller 
firms will be that much harder.
I have discussed the matter with other practitioners from 
similar-sized local and regional firms. The consensus is that we 
will be doing well to retain our existing publicly held clientele — 
that the chances of obtaining new clients who are or wish to become 
public will be slim indeed.
One of the less appealing features of the two-section plan is 
the method of financing the structure. Paragraph X of the Plan, 
dealing with financing and staffing, states that the costs of staff 
and meetings are paid out of the general budget of the AICPA. The 
cost of the Public Oversight Board and Special Projects, whatever 
those are, are paid out of the dues of the section. Presumably, 
the costs of publication, dissemination and other charges will also 
be borne by the general membership. It is certain that such costs 
will be material and in view of the fact that only 15% of the AICPA 
membership represent Big Eight accounting firms, the majority of 
the smaller and medium-sized firm members are required to subsidize 
the sectionalization program to an unknown but significant extent. 
It seems that we are being asked to pay in advance for our own 
funeral.
I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to express 
my views. I am certain these hearings will result in action which 
will further the public interest in this important area.
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The need for reform in the accounting profession has long 
been recognized. In October, 1974, the Commission on Auditors 
Responsibilities, the Cohen Commission, was established by 
the accounting profession to study the role and responsibility 
of independent auditors and in the spring of 1977 issued its 
report of tentative conclusions. At. the same time, Congress 
was also investigating the profession. One such investigation 
was responsible for a highly critical staff study, the Metcalf 
Staff Study, released December, 1976.
The Metcalf Staff Study apparently developed a crisis atmos­
phere in the profession. Instead of looking to the Cohen 
Commission and the recommendations suggested by that blue 
ribbon panel to meet the challenges facing the profession, 
the AICPA, in a crisis mode, developed a proposal to division­
alize the profession, campaigning for its adoption as "the 
only game in town." This proposal was adopted by the Council 
of the AICPA in September, 1977 and is now being implemented.
The concept of divisionalization - semantically but not 
substantively modified to "sectionalization" - emanated from 
Advisory Group C, one of the three advisory groups appointed 
a number of years ago to assist the management and adminis­
tration of the AICPA. In addition to Advisory Group C, 
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which is composed of representatives of the 15 largest 
CPA firms, there are also Advisory Groups A and B composed 
of representatives from the small and medium sized firms.
At the May, 1977 meeting of the Council when the Cohen 
Commission report was discussed, alternative reforms were 
not introduced. Neither was the concept of divisionalization 
presented to the Council. In fact, my first exposure to the 
divisionalization proposal came in late June at a meeting of 
Advisory Group B when the program was explained to us by 
Wallace E. Olson, President of the AICPA. Mr. Olson indi­
cated at that time that regional meetings of Council would 
be convened throughout the summer to expose the proposal and 
that it would be submitted to the September meeting of the 
AICPA Council for adoption.
Since the divisionalization proposal contained changes 
fundamental to the structure of public accounting, I imme­
diately exposed it to Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, the 
firm for which I serve as Managing Partner. As a national 
CPA firm founded in 1911 with 27 offices and 90 partners in 
the United States and an international affiliation with more 
than 160 offices, we were vitally concerned with this hastily 
conceived proposal which we believed to be inimical to the 
total reform needed. In September, 1977, therefore, Harris,
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Kerr, Forster issued a statement opposing the proposal to 
divisionalize the AICPA. That statement now can be seen to 
be prophetic.
The full text of the statement is appended to the written 
copy of my testimony before you today. In summary, it 
argues that the divisionalization proposal is undesirable 
for the following reasons:
1. It intensifies the current excessive concentration 
of major corporation audits in the "Big Eight" - a 
condition deplored in the Metcalf report.
2. It ignores one of the profession's most serious 
problems, i.e., the fragmented manner in which we 
develop and attempt to enforce professional 
standards.
3. It encourages Congressional supervision of the 
profession.
4. It increases the exposure of CPA firms to anti­
trust litigation.
5. It will cause an erosion in the practices of all 
small firms and force unwanted mergers with larger 
organizations.
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Since the text is attached, I shall not read it into the 
record. I note, however, that we expressed the view that 
the AICPA Council should not impose such a drastic change 
upon the full membership without evidence of an overwhelming 
favorable concensus. To obtain a valid concensus, we argued 
that a vote of the entire membership was needed. Again, the 
prophecy of those words was borne out in a recent litigation 
filed against the AICPA on the ground that reform of the 
magnitude adopted by the Council was so fundamental to the 
structure of the AICPA that it is, in effect, an amendment 
of the by-laws and therefore requires full membership approval.
Harris, Kerr, Forster is neither a participant in the liti­
gation nor a contributor to fund the cost of the suit. In 
fact, when the AICPA adopted the divisionalization concept, 
I wrote to Mr. Olson, stating, "While we remain skeptical of 
Council's decision, we do recognize our responsibility to 
abide by the majority view and work toward its satisfactory 
implementation."
Harris, Kerr, Forster does not oppose the basic proposals 
suggested in the divisionalization program. To the contrary, 
we believe the program contains reforms fundamental to 
responsible public reporting. But we cannot condone the 
structure developed to implement and enforce these reforms.
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To paraphrase from another profession, the appropriate 
directive from you ought to be, "Accountant, heal thyself!" 
I firmly believe the profession has the capability and 
should be permitted to implement its own meaningful reform. 
The profession should also be allowed a reasonable time 
period, at least until the end of 1978, to place its own 
house in order. This could be accomplished by utilizing 
fundamental strengths contained in the divisionalization 
proposal, provided that proposal is modified to eliminate 
the deficiencies we perceive. To this end, the Subcommittee 
certainly could provide positive impetus by promulgating a 
conceptual framework which would be acceptable and which 
would obviate the necessity for legislation.
As to the conceptual framework, the following deficiencies 
in the adopted divisionalization program should be corrected:
1. The two section concept should be eliminated. It 
is inappropriate to create first and second class 
citizens under the AICPA banner. The Firms 
Membership Division which has been established 
should continue, and membership criteria should be 
the same whether or not firms engage in SEC 
practice. To distinguish between sizes or cate­
gories of firms is unnecessary as, for example,
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the standards for peer review should be identical 
for all firms. All users of audit information 
should be entitled to the same standards of 
excellence; therefore, all member firms should 
be measured against the same standard of perfor­
mance.
2. The Executive Committee of the Firms Membership 
Division should neither be self perpetuating nor 
assure automatic membership to the larger firms. 
In effect, the requirements of membership on the 
current SEC Practice Section Executive Committee 
guarantees seats to the 15 largest firms, all of 
which coincidentally belonged to Group C which 
promulgated the divisionalization concept in the 
first place. This is tantamount to "placing the 
fox in charge of the chicken coop." As a matter 
of fact, immediately upon formation of the Execu­
tive Committee of the SEC Practice Section, it was 
given senior committee status which allows it to 
promulgate its own rules without approval of 
either the Council or the Board of Directors of 
the AICPA. Coincidentally, also, the Managing 
Partner of the country's largest accounting firm 
was appointed Chairman of the Committee.
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What is needed, instead, is a truly representative 
Executive Committee. The number of representatives 
of the largest firms who could serve at any one 
time should be limited. In other words, if a 
twelve member Executive Committee were appointed 
through the regular AICPA procedure for selection 
of committee members, it should be composed of 
representatives of four firms which would have 
fallen into the Group A category, four firms which 
would have fallen within the Group B category and 
four firms which would have fallen into the Group 
C category. In addition, a full-time, independent, 
paid Chairman and two other public oversight 
Committee members should be appointed.
The Chairman, as well as other oversight members, 
should be energetic, competent and prestigious 
citizens who are screened by a subcommittee repre­
senting the entire membership of the AICPA. The 
full-time Chairman should be adequately compen­
sated to attract an appropriate individual. One 
of the two public oversight members should be an 
SEC Commissioner, while the other could be drawn 
from academia or the business community.
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In summary, we believe the AICPA is a viable professional 
organization which can regulate itself. To do so, however, 
self-interest must be subordinated to public need. Your 
guidance could assist us in achieving this objective. Given 
the appropriate opportunity and framework, I am sure we will 
be able to demonstrate our responsibility to the public and 
our responsiveness to Congressional concerns.
On behalf of Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, I thank you 
for this opportunity to appear before you. I would be 
pleased to answer any questions you might have.
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BACKGROUND AND 
PURPOSE
Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, a na­
tional CPA firm founded in 1911, has 27 offices 
and 90 partners in the United States. Outside 
the United States, we are affiliated with various 
national accounting firms through an interna­
tional association with more than 160 offices 
known as Pannell Kerr Forster & Company. We 
provide the full spectrum of professional ser­
vices to clients of all sizes, including auditing 
approximately 40 publicly-held companies 
registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
We are submitting this position paper to all 
members of the AICPA Council because we 
believe that the AICPA Board of Directors’ pro­
posal to divisionalize the Institute is unrespon­
sive to the needs of our profession today. We 
believe that the proposal would undermine the 
unity of the profession. We urge, therefore, that 
it be rejected in its entirety and that valid alter­
native proposals be considered.
The AICPA proposes to establish two divisions, 
one for SEC Practice Firms and another for 
Private Companies Practice Firms. Each would 
regulate its own sphere of practice. Regulation 
within each division would include periodic peer 
review requirements, sanctions based upon 
review findings, minimum standards for contin­
uing education programs, public reporting of 
financial information by member firms, and 
other requirements relating to the execution of 
audit engagements.
The divisionalization concept is intended to 
satisfy Congressional concerns about the inade­
quacies in the profession brought to the public’s 
attention in recently concluded Congressional 
hearings. Divisionalization, therefore, is being 
proposed to provide the larger accounting firms 
the means to adopt improved quality-control 
measures to satisfy the critics. At the same time, 
the proposal purportedly affords the smaller 
firms a greater degree of autonomy in the con­
duct of their practices. Both these aims, 
desirable in themselves, can well be accom­
plished without the irreparable damage to the 
profession which divisionalization would cause.
SUMMARY OF 
OBJECTIONS
Although the willingness to enact reform is 
laudable, the specific means recommended to 
accomplish it are open to challenge from within 
the profession and from the Congress itself. 
After comprehensive review of the proposal, we 
believe divisionalization is undesirable for the 
following reasons:
1. It intensifies the current excessive con­
centration of major corporation audits in 
the “Big Eight”—a condition deplored in 
the Metcalf report.
2. It ignores one of the profession’s most 
serious problems, i.e., the fragmented 
manner in which we develop and attempt 
to enforce professional standards.
3. It encourages Congressional supervision 
of the profession.
4. It increases the exposure of CPA firms 
to antitrust litigation.
5. It will cause an erosion in the practices 
of all small firms and force unwanted 
mergers with larger organizations.
Congressional hearings were recently held in 
Washington, D.C., by the Senate’s Subcommit­
tee on Reports, Accounting and Management 
of the Committee on Government Operations. 
The hearings were prompted by the Metcalf 
report, formally entitled “The Accounting 
Establishment: A Staff Study,” an extensive 
review of the accounting profession. Among the 
recommendations of the report was the 
following:
The Federal Government should act to relieve ex­
cessive concentration in the supply of auditing and 
accounting services to major publicly-owned 
corporations.
The Institute’s proposal to create two divisions 
will only exacerbate the concentration problem. 
If divisions are created, major publicly-held cor­
porations would appear irresponsible if they ap­
pointed auditors not already members of the 
Division of SEC Practice Firms.
Divisionalization is tantamount to the formation 
of a private club for firms with SEC clients. 
This club could stifle competition by setting 
requirements that could make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for small firms to become members. 
By controlling membership this way, the Execu­
tive Committee of the SEC Practice Firms Divi­
sion could effectively deny publicly-held 
companies the right to select firms which, 
though not members of the club, still provide 
high-quality service.
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade 
Commission have targeted the professions for 
possible antitrust violations for limiting competi­
tion. In fact, the Metcalf report recommends 
that these agencies . . investigate and deter­
mine whether violations of the Federal antitrust 
laws have resulted from excessive concentration 
in the supply of such services [auditing and ac­
counting] among all industries or within specific 
industries.” The AICPA proposal intensifies the 
present concentration and, therefore, exposes 
the profession to the very antitrust litigation it 
should be seeking to minimize.
CONGRESSIONAL 
CONCERN
The Metcalf Staff Study concerns itself with 
public reporting by major corporations. This is 
evidenced in the December 7, 1976, letter from 
the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Lee Met­
calf, which accompanied the staff report to the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations:
... I am disturbed by . . . the alarming lack of in­
dependence and lack of dedication to public pro­
tection shown by the large accounting firms which 
perform the key function of independently certify­
ing the financial information reported by major 
corporations to the public. [Emphasis added]
The divisionalization proposal does not address 
the question of uniform quality necessary 
throughout the profession. Why should the 
CPA’s professional organization undertake 
reform to improve public reporting for only ma­
jor corporations? If reform is necessary, it 
should be applied universally. Are not all users 
of audited information entitled to the same stan­
dards of excellence? Thousands of small com­
panies, private and public, supply financial 
information to banks, other credit grantors, and 
government regulatory agencies that have the 
right to expect the same high-quality informa­
tion as that provided by major companies.
Those firms that follow the standards of the 
SEC Practice Firms Division will erroneously ap­
pear to be better than those that do not. Firms 
in the SEC Practice Division will effectively en­
joy the exclusive right to audit publicly-held 
companies. They will also become the preferred 
firms among other users of accounting services, 
including lending institutions that influence 
privately-held companies in their choice of 
auditors. A credit grantor might well be re­
garded as irresponsible if it recommends that a 
company engage a firm which has not volun­
tarily elected to meet the presumed higher pro­
fessional standards of the SEC Practice Firms 
Division. As a result, divisionalization will be 
detrimental to the practice of all small firms.
The AICPA proposal purports to provide small 
firms greater autonomy, since they will be 
relieved of the burden of having to adopt the 
same standards as larger firms. In the long run, 
however, they will experience an inexorable 
erosion of their practice as they lose clients to 
the larger firms which, because of divisionaliza­
tion, appear to be more qualified.
FRAGMENTATION OF 
THE PROFESSION
In a statement before the Metcalf Subcommittee 
on May 24, Eli Mason, the managing partner of 
Mason & Company, a New York City-based 
CPA firm, identified what has plagued the pro­
fession for years and what constitutes a major 
impediment in the effort to upgrade standards— 
the fragmentation of the profession’s structure. 
Only state boards license CPAs, but various 
groups regulate them. The AICPA sets audit 
standards. The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board sets accounting standards. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission sets disclosure stan­
dards for public companies. The Cost Account­
ing Standards Board sets cost accounting stan­
dards. For reform to be meaningful, it must
bring all these standard-setting activities together 
through a single organization with recognized, 
unquestioned authority. The Institute’s proposal 
not only fails to address the fragmentation prob­
lem, but compounds it.
If the Institute’s Council approves divisionaliza­
tion at its September 17 meeting (which it may 
not even have the authority to do), CPAs will 
only find the Congress urging more reform in 
the near future. It is ironic and unfortunate that 
a proposal designed to forestall Congressional 
intervention may eventually encourage it 
because of the proposal’s inherent defects.
DECISION REQUIRES 
CONSENSUS
The Council should not impose such a drastic 
change upon the membership without evidence 
of an overwhelming consensus favoring the 
change. To obtain a valid consensus, a vote of 
the entire membership must be taken. The 
Council’s regional meetings, which were con­
ducted in a crisis atmosphere in August, provid­
ed individual members neither the opportunity 
to consider carefully the implications of the pro­
posed divisionalization nor the forum to express 
their views.
THERE ARE VALID 
ALTERNATIVES
We believe there are valid, responsive alter­
natives to the present proposal. Meaningful 
reform must embody the concept of a single 
organization, perhaps federally chartered or 
created by statute, to promulgate all auditing 
standards and procedures, accounting prin­
ciples, rules of professional conduct, and 
prerequisites pertaining to the practice of public 
accounting. These uniformly determined rules 
should be enforced without discrimination.
The AICPA-appointed Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities (the Cohen Commis­
sion) issued its “Report of Tentative Conclu­
sions” last March with 40 recommendations 
which “are designed to speed the pace of 
change in the profession and to make it more 
receptive to the forces of change in the future.” 
One would think, therefore, that after the 
Board of Directors of the Institute had the 
foresight to appoint this special commission that 
the profession might first attempt to implement 
its final recommendations before resorting to the 
crisis management proposal of divisionalization.
After all the time and effort expended by this 
distinguished group, we cannot support a pro­
posal which now splinters our profession rather 
than addresses its basic problems. Instead of 
plunging pell-mell into further confusion, we 
urge that the Council of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants recognize its 
responsibility to the membership and appoint its 
own commission to implement the valid reforms 
already suggested, which are both constructive 
to the profession and responsive to its critics. 
Only action of this magnitude will achieve the 
long-range objectives of restoring public 
confidence in the integrity and usefulness of 
financial reports.
HARRIS, KERR, FORSTER & COMPANY
420 Lexington Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
(212) 867-8000
626 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 680-0900

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
JOHN E. MOSS, CALIF., CHAIRMAN
ROOM 2323 
Rayburn House Office Building 
Phone (202) 223-4441
JIM SANTINI, NEV. 
THOMAS A. LUKEN, OHIO 
DOUG WALGREN, PA.
ALBERT GORE, JR., TENN. 
CHARLES J. CARNEY, OHIO 
JAMES H. SCHEUER, N.Y. 
HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIF. 
PHILIP R. SHARP, IND. 
ANTHONY TOBY MOFFETT, CONN. 
ANDREW MAGUIRE, N.J. 
ROBERT (BOB) KRUEGER, TEX. 
HARLEY O. STAGGERS, W. VA. 
(ex officio)
JAMES M. COLLINS, TEX. 
NORMAN F. LENT, N.Y. 
MATTHEW J. RINALDO, N.J. 
DAVE STOCKMAN, MICH.
MARC L. MARKS, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO 
(ex officio)
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
JAMES L. NELLIGAN 
OPERATIONS DIRECTOR
JOHN MC ELROY ATKISSON 
COUNSEL TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE
TASK FORCE DIRECTORS
LOWELL DODGE—OVERSIGHT 
JOHN R. GALLOWAY—ENERGY 
ELLIOT A. SEGAL—HEALTH
J. THOMAS GREENE 
COUNSEL TO THE CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
BERNARD J. WUNDER 
MINORITY COUNSEL
DATE: Wednesday, February 1, 1978
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
PLACE: 2322 Rayburn House Office Building
SUBJECT: Hearings on the Accounting Profession: 
Efforts at Self-Reform
WITNESS LIST
Mr. Norman Auerbach 
Chairman 
Coopers § Lybrand 
New York, New York
Dr. John C. Burton
Professor
Columbia University
New York, New York
(formerly SEC Chief Accountant and Deputy 
Mayor of New York City for Comptroller 
activities)
Honorable Harold M. Williams
Chairman ,
Securities and Exchange Commission
Price Waterhouse Statement submitted for the record
is also attached

OPENING STATEMENT 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
FEBRUARY 1, 1978
This morning the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
continues its hearings into the self-regulatory efforts of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Yesterday, we heard from several representatives of the 
smaller accounting firms, who described the reasons why they have 
difficulty in competing with the large firms. We inquired in depth 
as to whether the self-regulatory program of the AICPA is likely 
to ameliorate or worsen that situation.
Today we will hear first from the Chairman of one of the 
Big Eight accounting firms who will describe a proposal for 
shared responsibility between the profession and the SEC. We will 
then hear from a former Chief Accountant of the SEC, and finally 
from the Chairman of the SEC.
/
The SEC has clear authority to prescribe the form and 
content of financial reports filed under the securities laws and 
the methods to be followed in their preparation. It has had such 
authority since the inception of the federal securities laws, 
and yet has been extremely reluctant to use it. We hope to 
explore how the SEC is now fulfilling the responsibilities for 
which it was given authority. We will also ask whether it is 
prudent to rely on a self-regulatory program which has no formal 
and direct connection to the SEC.
The SEC is uniquely suited to advise us on the merits of 
the AICPA program. In addition to its outstanding reputation as 
a regulatory commission, the SEC has had much experience with the 
strengths and weaknesses of self-regulation among securities 
brokers. Under the securities laws, a number of self-regulatory 
organizations of securities brokers and dealers are registered 
with the SEC and subject to its supervision. That framework 
has generally worked well, enabling the SEC to protect the 
public interest while drawing on the expertise and resources 
of the private sector to develop rules of professional conduct. 
We look forward to hearing the SEC's views on the adequacy of 
the AICPA program.
Our first witness this morning is Mr. Norman Auerbach, 
Chairman of the firm of Coopers & Lybrand.
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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee and staff, my name is 
Norman Auerbach. I am the chairman and chief executive officer of 
Coopers & Lybrand. I welcome this opportunity to present my views 
on the important issues that now face the profession.
I have followed closely the recent congressional interest in public 
accounting and conclude that this attention has brought about some 
needed focus on self-regulation in our profession. You, Mr. Chairman, 
and the late Senator Metcalf are responsible for expediting this 
process of reform. I will review what has been accomplished and what 
remains to be done. Also I hope to put into perspective the concerns 
that remain and how those concerns are to be addressed.
RECENT KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Let me recount briefly the profession’s key accomplishments. When 
this congressional interest began about a year ago, I agreed that the 
profession’s procedures for establishing accounting principles and 
auditing standards needed change. We have since made substantial 
progress toward self-reform.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board, the apparatus for estab­
lishing accounting principles, has revised its operating procedures 
to meet two essential needs - greater participation in standards- 
setting by the public and greater visibility, ’’sunshine," for 
the Board’s deliberations. It has continued to move toward the 
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elimination of many alternatives in accounting principles - for 
example, accounting in the oil and gas industry - certainly, a 
desired objective. The FASB is moving toward resolving some of the 
highly complex accounting issues, such as accounting for inflation, 
business combinations, and pensions. The FASB’s parent body - the 
Financial Accounting Foundation - has also provided for greater 
public participation.
A highly significant step was the establishment by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants of a Division of CPA firms 
with two sections: the Private Companies Practice Section and the SEC 
Practice Section. This latter organization of public company auditors 
was formed within a few months of the Metcalf Subcommittee hearings - 
and already over four hundred and twenty-five accounting firms have 
signed up to participate in the Section’s activities. This new 
Section, subject to public oversight, has been given the responsi­
bility for establishing the structure for maintaining audit quality. 
Some of the requirements of membership include peer review, adherence 
to the independence standards, continuing education of auditors, and 
maintenance of operating standards for firms, including rotation of 
partners on engagements. All of these are in the public interest. I 
do, however, have some concern about the way they will affect 
smaller accounting firms. I’ll talk more about this matter later.
Finally, the SEC is in the process of gathering information that 
relates to the independence of auditors and the impact on independ­
ence of the broad scope of public accountants’ services. The Commis­
sion is currently studying the public response to its proposal for 
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disclosure by registrants of the services provided by their auditors. 
While there are serious problems with the SEC proposals, we do feel 
that the issue of auditor independence is so important that any 
opportunity for realistic discussion of the fact of independence 
and the public’s perception of it is useful.
The final report of the Cohen Commission has just been released. 
It raises such issues as the adverse effects of extreme competition 
within the profession, the adverse effects of time pressures on audit 
quality, and the desirability of professional schools of accounting.
I do not pretend that all the questions are close to resolution, 
nor do I think an apology is necessary. These matters are as compli­
cated as they are important. For example, it is easy to say that the 
independence and reliability of an audit are enhanced when the 
auditing firm regularly changes the partner handling the audit, to 
get a ’’fresh look.” This type of approach is far easier for a 
hundred-partner firm to cope with than a five-partner firm. I use 
this example to show that the process of balancing various consider­
ations - such as the need for investor protection and the need to 
preserve smaller firms’ ability to practice - is not simple.
Will the changes already made and the new organization of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants deal effectively 
with the issue of discipline?
The issue of discipline can only be resolved in the context of a 
shared responsibility. To preserve the ability to regulate itself 
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and to retain the public’s confidence in that process, the profession 
needs public oversight and procedures for disciplining those few CPAs 
or firms who do not maintain high standards. There are two separate 
aspects of professional discipline. The first is the steps taken to 
prevent audit failures by establishing high standards of quality and 
performance in auditing publicly owned companies. The second aspect 
centers on procedures that apply when an audit firm does not properly 
discharge its responsibilities in a particular case - when an audit 
failure occurs.
The AICPA’s new SEC Practice Section is now working on the first 
aspect - preventive mechanisms to assure quality in the auditing of 
public companies. The Section’s Executive Committee and its Public 
Oversight Board will set the standards that must be applied in 
practice by member firms. In addition, a program of peer reviews - 
actually testing whether the procedures set forth by the Section are 
applied in the conduct of audits - is now being developed. The 
Section also will have the responsibility to impose sanctions on any 
members who do not take appropriate corrective action for weaknesses 
revealed by peer review. In addition it is my understanding that 
there will be a procedure for special peer review where there is 
substantial evidence that a breakdown in quality control has occurred.
The second aspect relates to action to be taken when an audit failure 
occurs. The SEC now has responsibility for investigating audit 
failures and appropriately disciplining those involved - either 
in the management of the company or in the auditing firm. The SEC 
is the proper body for exercising these functions. I recommend 
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that it continue to retain the sole responsibility for action in the 
case of audit failures.
This division of responsibility for professional discipline allows 
the profession to shoulder its full share of activities - standard 
setting, peer review, and enforcing adherence to standards. The SEC 
will retain the duty to act when the public is affected by a break­
down in the audit process. The Institute role then is properly one 
of prevention, while the SEC role is one of a regulator with full 
authority to investigate and take punitive action.
Despite the steps already taken, are there significant concerns re­
maining in the area of auditor independence?
Financial statements are an integral part of our economic system. An 
independent audit of the information presented by management is 
essential for the public interest, and it is also important that the 
public be satisfied that the auditor is independent.
The introduction of the corporate audit committee has been a powerful 
and progressive development that goes a long way toward bolstering 
the auditor’s independence, both in appearance and in fact. When 
disputes arise, it is easier for an auditor to defend his objectivity 
where the client has an active audit committee consisting of non­
management outside directors. I am concerned, however, with the 
suggestion that auditors require their clients to form audit com­
mittees of outside directors as a condition for continuing certi­
fication. To the contrary, I believe that the establishment of 
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audit committees must be formally mandated by the SEC, not by the 
auditor.
To begin with, my lawyers advised me that the SEC’s present authority 
to make accountants impose such a requirement is very doubtful; more­
over, if the profession were to do this without Government authority, 
we might run into antitrust problems as well as questions regarding 
directors’ liability. Aside from this, there would be serious ad­
verse adverse side effects. The SEC and the accounting profession 
are in agreement that the independent auditor should not intrude into 
the area of the client’s fundamental management responsibility. To 
quote the SEC in Accounting Series Release No. 126, dated July 5, 
1972:
”A part of the rationale which underlies any 
rule on independence is that managerial and 
decision-making functions are the responsi­
bility of the client and not of the inde­
pendent accountant.”
The separation of the accountant from the client’s internal manage­
ment functions and decisions is the foundation upon which the 
accountant’s independence rests. The suggestion that the independent 
accountant should dictate the client’s decision on establishment 
of its corporate structure represents a sharp and unjustified de­
parture from this tradition of separation and independence. The 
suggestion that all accountants must so intrude on their clients* 
policy decisions, would fundamentally alter the very nature of the 
client-accountant relationship.
Obviously it would not be enough to say, ’’You must have an audit 
committee." The requirement, to accomplish anything, would have to 
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include, at a minimum, a definition of "independent outside director." 
The very thought of an independent auditor establishing the cri­
teria of director independence is deeply disturbing.
In our view, the SEC should, in the public interest, mandate audit 
committees and provide the criteria and the broad guidelines for 
their operation. The audit committee should have the power of 
review over the auditors, encompassing fees, scope of service, 
adequacy of work, review of the results of the examination as 
well as dismissal, if appropriate.
Another area of concern is whether the performance of a broad range 
of professional services undermines the auditor’s independence. The 
practice of having public accountants provide consulting services is 
rooted in sound, long-standing tradition. While the larger firms 
have identified and structured the activity more formally, smaller 
firms have always regarded these consulting services as an integral 
part of their practice.
It is natural for a company to look to its accounting firm for as­
sistance in improving systems and controls. It expects, with 
justification, that the accounting firm has a special understanding 
of its information system needs. When an accounting firm satisfies 
this need, the company is helped in several ways: the company 
receives the benefits of the firm’s skills to improve its system and 
the information generated may facilitate the audit process. Per­
haps more important, as systems grow increasingly complex, with 
sophisticated computer installations, the early involvement of the
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auditor in systems design will reduce the cost of providing ap­
propriate audit safeguards and audit controls. The role of the 
auditor is expanding, and the performance of a modern audit requires 
a broad range of skills. The General Accounting Office, the account­
ing arm of the Congress, has taken the initiative in broadening the 
auditor’s role, calling upon engineers, economists, and even social 
scientists to assist in its work.
Our experience is that the interaction of auditors and specialists 
has significantly raised our auditors’ level of sensitivity and 
sophistication. This interaction may involve computer specialists, 
systems designers, inventory control specialists, or actuaries who 
measure pension liabilities.
Any restriction on our ability to practice on a broad basis will 
reduce our capacity to attract the high-caliber people we con­
sider essential. We have found in interviewing at schools across 
the country that applicants, especially at the graduate school 
level, are excited and challenged by the opportunity to participate 
in a broad and diverse practice. Narrowing our current scope of 
practice will make it more difficult for our Firm and indeed our 
profession to keep pace in maintaining audit quality in a rapidly 
changing environment.
Various studies - including one conducted by the Cohen Commission - 
have consistently shown that consulting services have no adverse ef­
fect on audit independence. This concern has been expressed only by 
a minority. In view of this, we think it appropriate that all 
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information on services performed for clients be evaluated by 
audit committees and that the proxy include a statement by the audit 
committee that they have reviewed all services performed by the 
auditor and are satisfied as to his independence.
Since much of the criticism has centered on the appearance rather 
than the fact of independence, our recommendations would eliminate 
many of these concerns. This would certainly be preferable to 
barring the auditor from utilizing needed skills and pushing the 
profession back to the green eyeshade days.
Is the existing structure for the establishment of auditing standards 
adequate?
I believe that changes are required to broaden participation in 
the standard-setting process. Our proposal would permit the audit­
ing profession to be more responsive to user expectations.
I recommend that the function of establishing auditing standards 
be assumed by a small, full-time panel under the auspices of an 
independent body - the Financial Accounting Foundation. This panel 
should be drawn from the public accounting profession, academia, and 
user groups; and it should be supported by a highly competent pro­
fessional staff. In addition, I propose that the panel draw upon 
experienced auditors in active practice to form small task forces to 
assist on implementation issues. These voluntary task force members 
can provide practical assistance to panel and staff.
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With this type of organization, representatives of user groups - 
financial analysts and Government accountants, for example - could 
participate in the development of new standards. At the same time, 
this independent organization would be free of any bias that might be 
perceived in the present AICPA structure. It could tap the expertise 
resident in both large and small accounting firms that are now unable 
to participate fully in the standard-setting process. I believe this 
feature - involving smaller accounting firms - is significant.
What impact will changes already made and under consideration have on 
smaller firms?
The accounting profession is not just the eight largest or the fif­
teen largest firms. It is thousands of firms reaching into every 
city and town and serving small businesses as well as corporate 
giants. It is in the public interest to protect the viability of 
the smaller firms, which perform critically important functions 
for American business.
It has been suggested that some of the changes proposed for the 
accounting profession may adversely affect the smaller firms. These 
include: lifting the restrictions on advertising, open solicitation 
of clients as well as partners and staffs of others, disclosure of a 
firm’s financial data, rules on rotation of partners on an engage­
ment, required peer review, required continuing education, the audit 
committee, and proposed limitations on scope of practice.
Removing existing bans on advertising and solicitation might put 
the medium and small firms at a substantial competitive disadvantage 
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because of the disparity in resources available to them in contrast 
to those available to larger firms.
Similarly, a requirement for more complete financial reporting 
could subject the smaller firms to unfavorable comparisons. I 
recognize that the disclosure of certain financial information, 
such as having a large proportion of the firm’s income derived 
from a single client and the amount of insurance coverage in force, 
may be appropriate or even essential. In addition some prospective 
clients might be unduly influenced by disparities in firm size; 
thus disclosure of gross fees or profits could put smaller firms 
at a competitive disadvantage. Sheer firm size is not necessarily 
an indication of quality and should not be the criterion by which 
firms are judged.
Certain proposals designed to ensure auditor independence and 
improve audit quality may adversely affect the smaller firms. The 
proposals for rotation of partners on an engagement, for peer review, 
and for continuing education, fit in this category. I am not sug­
gesting that these rules not be adopted. The rules are needed to 
protect the public interest, but at the same time it is essential to 
find a way to lessen the impact on smaller firms.
The requirements for peer review and continuing education might be 
specially modified in the case of a CPA firm with only one or two 
publicly owned company clients. I suggest that the review process 
might be applied only to those procedures and controls utilized in 
the audit of public companies. Similarly, the requirements for 
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continuing education might apply only to the personnel assigned to 
the audit of public companies. While providing special rules makes 
the task more difficult, the benefit - protecting the smaller firms’ 
ability to practice - seems to be worth the cost.
On the subject of audit committees, we have heard it said that the 
audit committee review may somehow result in a transfer of client 
accounts from smaller firms to larger ones. This is mere speculation. 
We would hope and expect that audit committees would put the emphasis 
exactly where it should be - on quality performance. It is my 
believe that, upon reflection, most smaller firms will opt for 
meeting the same standards as those established for the larger firms. 
Nevertheless, alternatives must be considered.
Small firms should be able to retain their clients as these clients 
grow and go public, providing they do not compromise the standards 
on which the public depends. In the spirit of support, we have 
worked ’’behind the scenes” with many smaller firms in providing 
technical assistance in the application of auditing standards, 
guidance in meeting SEC requirements, and consultation in helping 
them carry out difficult auditing assignments.
We have also shared our technical expertise broadly through the 
publication of the definitive auditing text, Montgomery’s Auditing, 
which we have published in nine editions since 1913. In fact, 
we were asked - and offered - in a recent instance to provide our 
publications, training materials, and even our technical consulting 
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assistance to an association of smaller firms on a very reasonable 
fee basis.
Continuing in this spirit, I propose that the new organization of 
firms practicing before the SEC address the problem by setting up a 
board of qualified practitioners to provide this type of consulting 
help to smaller firms. This help could be extended to include a 
review of public company engagements in those cases where rotation of 
the partner is not practical. Recognizing that there are difficult 
issues inherent in this proposal, I hope they could be resolved and 
this board could operate in a support role without disturbing an 
existing auditor-client relationship.
Are additional steps warranted to give the public greater assurance 
of audit quality worldwide?
The question has been raised as to how an auditing firm can maintain 
the same high standards of quality control all around the world. Our 
International Firm has implemented a series of policy statements 
establishing audit procedures worldwide. The procedures must be fol­
lowed in all work, whether international or purely domestic in nature.
In Coopers & Lybrand, auditing performed anywhere in the world is 
done on a uniform basis, and we conduct international peer reviews 
to satisfy ourselves that our offices around the world are complying 
with established policies and procedures. Recognizing the current 
interest in internal control and building on the Coopers & Lybrand 
approach, which is systems oriented, we have compiled and are 
presently field testing a document known as the Internal Control
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Reference Manual. This document is a practical tool which details 
the circumstances that can give rise to a weakness in internal 
control. It will also provide an effective tool to meet the require­
ments of the recently enacted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
In addition to our internal peer review program, our International 
Firm has prepared training materials, translated into the principal 
languages, that are in use worldwide. Our International Firm has 
also arranged hundreds of staff exchanges to promote understanding 
of, and sensitivity to, conditions in other countries.
We are confident that these procedures ensure that our worldwide 
practice is conducted according to uniformly high standards. 
These are not empty words. Even though there are separate legal 
entities in most countries, we have adopted a policy of assuming 
responsibility in the United States for work performed for a U. S. 
client by our International Firm anywhere in the world.
PROGRESS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Reform of our profession is well underway. We have already made 
substantial progress and have demonstrated our determination to work 
vigorously until fair and practicable solutions are found. The most 
important underlying factor is that this is being accomplished by 
self-regulation.
Assistance and oversight from Government, through the SEC and this 
Subcommittee, are needed. Although the SEC already performs in 
the area of audit failures, its responsibility, in our opinion, 
14
should be extended to cover the required establishment of audit 
committees.
You have created a climate for reform in the private sector. We 
have responded to your call and will accomplish in an orderly way 
all of the improvements in quality and performance which are required 
in the public interest.
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STATEMENT OF JOHN C. BURTON BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
February 1, 1978
My name is John C. Burton I am professor of accounting and finance 
at The Columbia University Graduate School of Business. From 1972 to 1976 
I served as Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and from 1976 until the end of 1977 I was Deputy Mayor for Finance of the 
City of New York.
I appreciate having the opportunity to express my views to the Sub­
committee on the important subject of these hearings. Because I believe 
the role of the accounting profession is a vital one in our capital market 
system, I think it is essential that an institutional structure be estab­
lished for the profession that will provide the public with assurance 
that this role is being performed both responsibly and effectively. Such 
a structure will also offer institutional stability to the profession and 
will permit it to devote its considerable talents to developing innovative 
approaches to auditing rather than to legal matters.
•Unfortunately, I do not believe that the new divisional structure 
created by the AICPA and described to you earlier in these hearings is 
adequate to provide either effective surveillance over accounting practice 
or the institutional stability required by the profession. While it is a 
significant step forward compared to the previous efforts of the AICPA 
at professional discipline and many of its characteristics may be utilized 
in the development of an effective system of professional self regulation, 
in the final analysis I believe that the AICPA system taken as a whole 
must be characterized as insufficient.
There are at least six reasons why the AICPA program is not likely to 
achieve its objectives or meet the public need. They are as follows :
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1. The AICPA does not have the legal authority to achieve effective 
surveillance and discipline over the profession. If its sanctions are 
to be effective, they are very likely to constitute violation of the 
anti-trust laws as restraints on competition. In addition, the rights 
of all parties to legal due process make it likely that the AICPA sanc­
tions could be successfully challenged in court and that professionals 
who work on reviews which lead to sanctions might be held personally 
subject to legal action.
2. Even if the AICPA's system were to survive legal attacks, the sanc­
tions imposed would lack the force of law and if the S.E.C. were to im­
pose its sanctions on an offending firm, it would have to perform its 
own investigation and cite the firm under a Rule 2(c) or other formal 
proceeding. This would mean that an offending firm would be legally 
free to continue to practice before the Commission for an extended time 
while a second set of proceedings was completed.
3. In addition to the legal problems associated with a private surveillance 
mechanism, there are serious problems of public perception which will 
exist. The AICPA program, under which major accounting firms will review 
each other, is likely to be seen as a process of mutual back-scratching. 
While a prestigious group of persons will be gathered to serve as a 
Public Oversight Board, it is highly doubtful that a part time group can 
either in fact or perception provide" an effective substitute for statu­
tory regulation” as the AICPA contends.
4. The AICPA program does not deal with the major problems of enormous 
legal costs, delay and legal obstruction which face plaintiffs in cases 
where they seek to recover damages from accountants. It is essential 
that the process created provide for a means of making prompt administra­
tive determinations of professional culpability in cases where investor 
losses occur which can be related to deficient financial reporting.
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5. The AICPA program does not provide for an auditing or peer review 
standard setting process which includes both participation by those 
without self interest in the development of standards and review of 
standards by a governmental body. The governing body of the AICPA 
of S.E.C. practice division is the Executive Committee which is made 
up of representatives of the firms with S.E.C. practice. While the 
Public Oversight Board may review, recommend and publicize, the standard 
setting of the Division is still the responsibility of the Executive 
Committee. Auditing standard setting is currently the responsibility 
of the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, another AICPA committee. 
While changes may result from the report of the Commission on Auditor 
Responsibility, formal authority for oversight by the S.E.C. ( such as 
exists by statute in the case of accounting standard setting) is not 
likely to be a part of any process developed by the AICPA,
6. A private sector process such as that envisaged by the AICPA does 
not affect the potential liability of CPA firms. Unlimited liability 
which exists today raises the stakes of potential actions for damages 
and this leads to protracted litigation in which counsel rather than 
investors are the principal winners. In addition, unlimited liability 
substantially deters innovation in auditing and the development of new 
services by auditors such as limited reviews, reports on internal 
controls and others which may provide great benefit to investors. Un­
limited liability also tends to reduce competition in the profession 
by making it harder for small firms with limited assets and insurance 
coverage to compete with major firms, While no one would suggest that 
liability should be eliminated, and I personally believe that a simple 
negligence standard should be sufficient to impose it, I do believe that 
a limitation on liability based on a multiple of perhaps ten times
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aggregate fees paid to an independent accountant on an engagement 
would provide sufficient deterrence to deficient professional work 
and a significant contribution to the loss of damaged investors while 
avoiding the adverse consequences to the public which flow from the 
existence of unlimited liability.
As can be seen from the above list, the insufficiency of the AICPA 
program does not result primarily from the unwillingness of the accounting 
profession to design an effective system but rather from the inadequacy 
of its authority to do so. The efforts of the profession in the past 
year suggest that it is willing to step forward. This indicates that 
a system of formal self regulation under federal oversight is likely to 
be successful and direct federal regulation of the profession will not 
be necessary.
I recommend, therefore, that legislation be enacted which would 
create such a formal self regulatory system. The legislation should 
authorize the creation and registration with the S.E.C. of a self 
regulatory body which would be a private sector institution subject to 
the oversight of the Commission. The governing body of this organiza­
tion would be a Board of Directors, half of whose members would be 
accountants practicing before the S.E.C. and half public members drawn 
from the business, financial, professional and academic communities.
Membership in the organization would be a condition for practice 
before the Commission. Membership would be by firm and all member 
firm partners would have to be associated members and hence subject 
to its jurisdiction. Membership would also provide protection from 
unlimited liability but at the same time members would be required to 
submit to an administrative process which would simplify substantially 
the process of bringing a complaint and seeking damages for professional 
deficiencies.
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The registered organization would be required to perform five 
principal functions:
1) The registration of firms and associated members, including a process 
for making certain information about registrants publicly available.
This would require the creation of a registration form which describes 
the firm, its clientelle, its quality control procedures, its associated 
members, and certain financial information. This would be updated period­
ically. The registration process ultimately should also include some 
periodically filed evidence of competence beyond state CPA licensing 
requirements and may require such institutional changes as outside 
directors and independent auditors or the equivalent for registered 
firms.
2) The establishment of standards for auditing and other aspects of 
professional practice.
Standard setting should include both auditing standards and 
standards of professional practice. The former would deal with problems 
of audit verification and reporting while the latter would include 
problems of ethics, business conduct, quality control, staff supervision, 
and other areas which affect the public. The process of standard 
setting should be the primary responsibility of a standard setting 
board which would include public representation. Extensive participa­
tion by all interested persons should be part of the process, including 
an exposure period for public comment before final standards are issued. 
After standards are issued by this board, they will be reviewed by the 
Board of Directors which will have the right to return them to the 
standard setting board for further consideration. Standards will then 
be reviewed and approved by the S.E.C.
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3) The regular surveillance of practice of its member firms.
Surveillance would be accomplished by conducting regular reviews of 
the practice of its member firms. These reviews would be made both by 
the organization’s own professional staff and by professionals in public 
practice under its supervision. If the results of a review were not 
satisfactory, the matter would be referred to the enforcement function 
for appropriate remedial or disciplinary steps.
4) Investigation of professional deficiencies and institution of 
disciplinary proceedings, with appropriate due process protection.
The organization would have the authority to investigate professional 
deficiencies uncovered by its own surveillance and claim resolution func­
tions or referred to it by the S.E.C. or the public. To do this, it would 
maintain an investigative staff. This staff would have the authority to 
compel testimony and the submission of documents from any member firm or 
associated member subject to the penalties of perjury and upon pain of 
dismissal from the organization for refusal to testify. Testimony and 
documents could be obtained from others with the protection of confiden­
tiality. Where formal subpoena power is needed, the matter can be referred 
to the S.E.C. for governmental enforcement action or for the authoriza­
tion of joint investigations with the S.E.C. enforcement staff. The 
organization’s staff would be legally immunized from liability resulting 
from performing their investigative function.
The investigations staff would present its investigative results and 
its recommendation for disciplinary action to the Board of Directors for 
action. The Board would have the authority to impose substantial fines 
for disciplinary purposes as well as to suspend members and associate 
members from membership ( and hence from practice before the S.E.C.) 
either temporarily or permanently. In addition, the Board could order 
any other specific remedies which it deemed appropriate in particular
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circumstances. All Board determinations would be subject to S.E.C. over­
sight and to appeal to the Commission by affected parties after the deter­
mination had been made public. Further appeal to the Federal Court of 
Appeals after the S.E.C. review would also be possible.
5) The resolution of claims for damages made against members.
This would require the creation of an administrative procedure to 
simplify the process of making claims for damages against accountants arising 
out of deficient professional work. Included would be claim investigation 
in order to gather necessary facts, a presentation of the facts in a sys­
tematic report, and a professional evaluation and recommended resolution 
to any claim brought. This claim investigation function could be utilized 
either as the final resolution of a claim or by either party in a law suit 
to provide a professional evaluation of the merits of a case. The report 
would be admissible in a Court of Law. A member would be required to 
participate in the process at the request of a claimant, although the 
member would have the ability to appeal any determination to the S.E.C. 
and ultimately to the Court of Appeals.
If such an administrative process were in place to simplify the 
currently enormously complex process of bringing a case against accountants, 
it might be consistent with public policy to limit the liability of 
accountants under the securities laws to ten times fees in the absence 
of demonstrable intent to deceive.
The ideas which I have expressed here today are only an outline of a 
self regulatory program. I have developed these ideas in somewhat more 
detail in a paper which I am submitting for the record.
If the approach is to be successful, the organization which would be 
established to perform the self regulatory functions is of paramount im­
portance. It must be highly professional, offer a rewarding and remuner­
ative career path for staff and draw extensively upon the participation of 
members. The member role must be real and effective. If such an organiza­
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tion can be established, the partnership provided by a formal self 
regulatory mechanism is one which offers substantial benefits.
In summary, it is my view that a formal self regulatory approach 
is one which offers both public protection and institutional stability 
for the accounting profession. I am a great supporter of the profession 
and I believe that it has a major role to play in our economic society. 
For it to play that role effectively, it must have the tools to police 
itself and the oversight to provide continuing assurance that the public 
is being fully protected. I urge that the legislative process to provide 
both tools and oversight be promptly undertaken.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAROLD M. WILLIAMS, CHAIRMAN, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
February 1, 1978
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee, I 
APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN THE SUBCOMMITTEE THIS 
MORNING AND TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF AN 
APPROPRIATE SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR THE ACCOUNTING 
profession. Accountants play a key role in the capital 
FORMATION PROCESS ON WHICH AMERICAN BUSINESS RESTS AND 
ARE VITAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN 
THAT PROCESS- BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT COMMISSION 
REGISTRATION STATEMENTS AND PERIODIC REPORTS INCLUDE AUDITED 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION, INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS EXERCISE 
SIGNIFICANT CONTROL OVER CORPORATE ACCESS TO CAPITAL FROM 
THE INVESTING PUBLIC AND, THUS, OCCUPY A UNIQUE ROLE IN THE
AREA OF THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITIES- WHILE ACCOUNTANTS 
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CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE GUARANTORS OF THE ACCURACY OF 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, THEIR ROLE ENCOMPASSES A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENTS STEWARDSHIP 
RESPONSIBILITIES, WHETHER THE ISSUE IS THE LEVEL OF 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETECTION OF MANAGEMENT MISCONDUCT, THE 
APPROVAL OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN APPLICABLE ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES, OR THE EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS.
My testimony before the late Senator Metcalf's 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUNE 23, 1977, SETS FORTH THE COMMIS­
SION'S VIEWS REGARDING THE IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING THE 
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION. In ADDITION, I CONTINUED TO 
ADDRESS MANY OF THESE ISSUES IN THREE SUBSEQUENT SPEECHES 
-- MY REMARKS LAST SUMMER AT THE MEETING OF THE CALIFORNIA 
CPA Society which Chairman Moss also addressed; my talk 
SEVERAL MONTHS AGO AT THE SEAVIEW SYMPOSIUM; AND MY 
SPEECH LAST MONTH AT THE AICPA FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
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Current SEC Developments. I understand that copies of those 
FOUR DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE, 
AND I WILL NOT BURDEN YOUR RECORD WITH A RESTATEMENT OF THEIR 
CONTENT THIS MORNING- I WOULD, HOWEVER. LIKE TO STRESS ONE 
FUNDAMENTAL, OVER-RIDING POINT FROM THOSE MATERIALS BEFORE 
TURNING TO WHAT I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE CHIEF AREA OF CONCERN 
in the Subcommittee's current proceedings -- professional 
SELF-REGULATION.
Independence -- in fact, in appearance, and in mental 
ATTITUDE -- IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WORK OF THE OUTSIDE AUDITOR- 
In many ways, the public has expectations of the profession 
AND OF WHAT THE AUDITOR'S REPORT MEANS THAT EXCEED REALITY- 
TO THE EXTENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE AUDITING 
PROCESS AS A WHOLLY UNBIASED REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT'S 
PRESENTATION OF THE CORPORATE FINANCIAL PICTURE, I BELIEVE THAT
THE EXPECTATIONS ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED AND MUST BE FULLY MET-
Independence is the auditor's single most valuable attribute 
— indeed, it is perhaps the single attribute which justifies 
THE EXISTENCE OF ACCOUNTING AS A SEPARATE PROFESSION- If THE 
PROFESSION CANNOT SATISFY ITS OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN BOTH THE 
APPEARANCE AND THE FACT OF INDEPENDENCE, I SUSPECT THAT 
LEGISLATION IS INEVITABLE-
With that thought in mind, I would like to devote the
BALANCE OF MY PREPARED REMARKS TO SOME BRIEF OBSERVATIONS
CONCERNING THE A ICPA'S INITIATIVE AT PROFESSIONAL SELF­
REGULATION -- the Division of CPA firms and the related
SEC Practice Section- At the outset, I think it
IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIS TWO POINTS- FIRST, WHILE A NUMBER
OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAM ARE CRITICAL, THE KEY TO 
THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE AICPA'S EFFORT LIES WITH THE
Public Oversight Board. It is the Board which will set the
PACE AND TONE OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION'S ACTIVITIES AND
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WHICH WILL DETERMINE HOW AGGRESSIVELY, EVEN-HANDEDLY, AND 
THOROUGHLY THOSE ACTIVITIES ARE PURSUED. WITHOUT A STRONG, 
INDEPENDENT, AND OUTSPOKEN PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, I DO NOT 
BELIEVE THAT THE AICPA PROPOSALS WILL BE VIABLE-
Second, in order to give the AICPA's efforts a fair 
CHANCE, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THE PROFESSION SHOULD 
NOW BE ALLOWED SOME TIME FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROGRAM IT HAS PROPOSED. In THE COMING MONTHS, THE COMMISSION 
WILL HAVE THIS INITIATIVE AT VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION 
UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY AND WILL LOOK TO THE RESULTS ACHIEVED 
AS THE BASIS FOR FORMING JUDGMENTS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE 
PROGRAM'S ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS- As THE SUBCOMMITTEE IS 
AWARE, THE COMMISSION HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO REPORT TO 
Congress on July 1, 1978, concerning the profession's overall 
EFFORTS TO MEET THE CONCERNS WHICH CONGRESS AND OTHERS HAVE
RAISED DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS- A REVIEW OF THE
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DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION WILL 
CERTAINLY BE A MAJOR PART OF THAT REPORT. WHILE JULY 1, MAY 
BE TOO EARLY TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION CONCERNING THE 
INITIATIVE, 1 BELIEVE THAT WE WILL BE IN A MUCH BETTER POSTURE 
TO JUDGE ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS AT THAT TIME-
IN STRESSING THAT THE PROFESSION SHOULD BE GIVEN AN 
OPPPORTUNITY TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM IT HAS PROPOSED. I DO 
NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT THE COMMISSION IS WHOLLY SATISFIED 
WITH THAT PROGRAM- LAST SEPTEMBER, IN A LETTER TO WALLACE E. 
Olson, the AICPA's president, I communicated the Commission's 
VIEWS IN THIS AREA, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
HAS A COPY OF THAT LETTER- I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY 
the Commission's two major areas of concern-
First, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO GIVE
the Public Oversight Board decision-making authority. As I
SAID IN MY LETTER TO Mr. OLSON, THE COMMISSION, BASED ON ITS 
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EXPERIENCE WITH SELF-REGULATION IN OTHER AREAS, BELIEVES THAT 
ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL AREAS OF WEAKNESS CENTERS 
AROUND THE POSSIBILITY OF DOMINATION OF THE ORGANIZATION BY 
ONE OR MORE OF THE MAJOR FIRMS. THE MAJOR FIRMS IN THE 
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION WILL ENJOY AUTOMATIC FIRM MEMBERSHIP ON 
the Executive Committee and, in turn, that committee will 
appoint the Peer Review Committee. This selection process 
WILL BE COUPLED WITH FIRM PEER REVIEW. THE WILLINGNESS OF 
ONE LARGE FIRM TO CRITICIZE ANOTHER IS OPEN TO SERIOUS 
QUESTION AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION MAY BE 
ONE OF A LACK OF OBJECTIVITY, REGARDLESS OF THE REALITY-
For these reasons, the Commission believes that the 
Public Oversight Board should have direct responsibility 
FOR CONDUCTING PEER REVIEWS AND DETERMINING APPROPRIATE 
sanctions. Thus far the AICPA has been unwilling to do
THIS. In accord with our suggestions, the Institute did
HOWEVER, MODIFY ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION CREATING THE BOARD TO
REQUIRE BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND PEER REVIEW COMMITTEES TO 
CONSULT WITH THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD IN THE COURSE OF 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS. 
This requirement for consultation acknowledges the influence 
THAT THE BOARD MUST HAVE, AND I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT 
the Section cannot function effectively as it is now 
structured. Nonetheless, the Commission still believes that 
direct authority would enhance the Board's prospects for 
success.
A SECOND MATTER WHICH THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THE AICPA 
SHOULD FULLY ADDRESS IS THE INTENDED SCOPE OF ONE OF THE 
MOST VITAL ASPECTS OF ITS INITIATIVE -- THE MANDATORY PEER 
REVIEW PROGRAM. IN MY JUDGMENT, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES, 
AS I SUGGESTED A MOMENT AGO, IS WHETHER THE REVIEW SHOULD BE
FIRM-ON-FIRM, AS CONTRASTED TO BEING DIRECTED BY THE PEER 
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REVIEW COMMITTEE OR THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD. CON­
SIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO WHETHER THE STAFF 
PERFORMING THE REVIEWS SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS FROM 
OUTSIDE THE PROFESSION. THE QUESTION HERE BECOMES ONE OF 
BALANCING THE BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE ENHANCEMENT OF 
OBJECTIVITY OR AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF OBJECTIVITY 
AGAINST THE INCREASED COST AND INEFFICIENCIES, IF ANY, OF 
SUCH A REVIEW PROCESS-
There are other important issues concerning the scope 
OF PEER REVIEWS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED. FOR EXAMPLE, 
AUTOMATIC EXCLUSION OF CASES IN LITIGATION 
FROM THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW COULD PLACE A MAJOR CLOUD 
OVER THE REVIEW PROCESS AND, AT A MINIMUM, RAISES A 
AND COMPLEX PROBLEM TO WHICH THE PROFESSION MUST 
AFFORD SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. While I RECOGNIZE THE
VERY DIFFICULT OBSTACLES TO PEER REVIEW OF PROBLEM OR 
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LITIGATED AUDITS, SUCH AUDITS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM 
REVIEW WITHOUT DEVELOPING SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVES 
DESIGNED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THAT 
AUDIT WERE SYMPTOMATIC OF A WEAKNESS IN THE FIRM'S QUALITY 
CONTROL SYSTEM. WHOLESALE EXCLUSION OF PROBLEM AUDITS 
WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 
PEER REVIEW PROCESS-
TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE SCOPE OF REVIEWS MUST ALSO GO 
CONSIDERABLY BEYOND THAT ORIGINALLY DESIGNED IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE VOLUNTARY REVIEW PROGRAM. THE AICPA HAS RECOGNIZED 
THIS FACT AND IS NOW REVIEWING THE CHANGES WHICH SHOULD BE 
IMPLEMENTED IN THE SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM- THE COMMISSION 
WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW WHICH THE 
Institute ultimately requires in order to satisfy itself 
THAT NO MATERIAL AREAS ARE OMITTED. THE COMMISSION IS 
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
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ENCOMPASS BOTH A FIRM'S PROCEDURES FOR INTER-OFFICE 
COORDINATION IN THE CASE OF AUDITS INVOLVING MORE THAN 
ONE OFFICE, AND THE MECHANISMS WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING FIRMS EMPLOY TO ASSURE QUALITY CONTROL IN THE 
FOREIGN SEGMENTS OF THEIR PRACTICE-
The Commission believes that it is appropriate and 
DESIRABLE THAT THE AICPA BE GIVEN A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO 
INSTITUTE EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION BEFORE CONGRESS CONSIDERS 
THE IMPOSITION OF OTHER FORMS OF REGULATION- In THAT 
CONNECTION, THIS SUBCOMMITTEE'S HEARINGS PROVIDE A VALUABLE 
VEHICLE FOR EMPHASIZING TO THE PROFESSION THE IMPORTANCE WHICH 
Congress attaches to its efforts and the fact that prompt and 
EFFECTIVE ACTION IS ESSENTIAL. DURING THE COMING MONTHS, THE 
Commission intends to do everything within its power to continue 
TO CONVEY THAT SAME SENSE OF URGENCY AND TO HELP TO PROMOTE THE
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION. PRESSURE FROM BOTH 
the Commission and Congress serves to create a countervailing 
FORCE TO OFFSET THE CLIENT AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH 
UNDERSTANDABLY AND SUBTLY IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION. THIS SORT 
OF COUNTERVAILING TENSION IS, IN MY JUDGMENT, THE ESSENCE OF 
EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE CONGRESSIONAL AND COMMISSION OVERSIGHT 
OF THE PROFESSION-
The AICPA must show willingness and ability to transform 
ITSELF INTO A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT SELF-REGULATORY BODY 
CAPABLE OF IMPOSING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REFORMS AND 
DISCIPLINE UPON ITS MEMBERSHIP- As I MENTIONED EARLIER, THE 
Commission will report to Congress on progress toward that 
goal on July 1, 1978. The criteria against which we will be 
measuring the AICPA's program of self-regulation will include --
The ability of the Public Oversight Board to
FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY.
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The thoroughness, quality, and independence of
THE MANDATORY PEER REVIEW PROGRAM.
The Executive Committee's record of meaningful 
RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS PRESENTED TO IT BY 
the Public Oversight Board and the Peer Review 
Committee-
Development OF AN EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINARY 
STRUCTURE-
The profession's response, whether through the 
Division of CPA firms or some other appropriate 
VEHICLE, TO THE COHEN COMMISSION'S FINAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS-
And, most importantly, the profession's success 
-- AS individuals, firms, and a professional 
ORGANIZATION -- IN ENHANCING, AS PART OF ITS 
PROCESS, THE VITAL INGREDIENT OF INDEPENDENCE- 
While independence has many aspects, one of 
THE KEYSTONES, IN MY JUDGMENT, IS ACTION TO 
CREATE A PROFESSIONAL STANDARD REQUIRING 
INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEES IN PUBLIC 
COMPANIES-
The Commission strongly supports the goal of fostering
A STRONG PRIVATE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 
THE PUBLIC WITH INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE AND VERIFICATION OF
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THE FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY PUBLIC COMPANIES'
I BELIEVE THAT THE PROFESSION IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE SELF" 
REGULATION, AND THE COMMISSION INTENDS TO WORK ACTIVELY
WITH THE PROFESSION AND THE CONGRESS IN SUPPORTING THAT EFFORT.
This Subcommittee can be confident of the Commis­
sion's CONTINUING CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 
OF PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION IN THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 
AND OF OUR DESIRE TO WORK WITH THE CONGRESS AND THE 
PROFESSION.
That concludes my prepared statement, and I would be 
HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THE 
Subcommittee may have.

STATEMENT OF 
JOHN C. BIEGLER 
SENIOR PARTNER OF PRICE WATERHOUSE & CO.
SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OF THE HEARINGS 
ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
January 30, 1978
On behalf of the United States firm of Price 
Waterhouse & Co., I am pleased to set forth our views 
on what we believe is the central issue that the Sub­
committee on Oversight and Investigations will face 
in its forthcoming hearings. That issue is the quality 
of the accounting profession’s audit practice — both 
on a national and international level.
I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
We believe that the plan of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is 
an impressive initial step to assure the highest level 
of audit practice in the United States. While the AICPA 
plan is not as far-reaching as we might have preferred, 
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we strongly support that plan, will assist in its effec­
tive implementation, and believe that it should be given 
a reasonable opportunity to succeed.
The AICPA plan understandably concentrates on 
the quality of audit practice in the United States. 
But, comprehensive concern with audit quality must also 
deal with the international aspects of an audit engage­
ment.
Price Waterhouse has long been aware of the 
need for international quality control programs. The 
experience of our firm has led us to the conclusion 
that any firm conducting an international practice should 
have an international quality control program that in­
cludes the following elements:
(i) Supervision and control by a U.S. firm 
of all international audit engagements for U.S. clients 
of that firm.
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(ii) The opportunity for review by a U.S. 
firm of reports prepared abroad by its related firms 
which will either be filed in the United States by such 
related firms or relied upon by other accounting firms 
in reporting upon financial statements filed in the 
United States; and
(iii) The creation of an international structure 
of related firms to establish quality control standards 
and monitor through periodic reviews the quality of 
each related firm’s international audit practice.
  Although it is possible that regulatory or other 
initiatives may be required to implement this program, 
certainly there are steps that firms with an inter­
national practice can, and should, take unilaterally 
and voluntarily. Evaluation and consideration can also 
be given to the possibility of expanding the AICPA’s 
quality control review plan to recognize, to the extent 
possible, these essential elements of responsible 
international practice.
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II. THE AICPA PLAN DESERVES AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO SUCCEED
Concern with the quality of audit practice was 
reflected both in this Subcommittee’s earlier report 
published in October 1976 and in the hearings held last 
Spring before the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management chaired by the late Senator 
Metcalf. Both Congressional panels identified an erosion 
of public confidence in the accounting profession.
We at Price Waterhouse are deeply concerned 
with any loss of confidence in our profession. Confi­
dence in the integrity and competence of the profession 
is essential to the well-being of our nation’s economy. 
As your Subcommittee correctly pointed out in its report, 
"The auditor must perform in a manner that warrants 
confidence."
We believe that over the years Price Waterhouse, 
and the profession in general, have performed with inde­
pendence and with a high level of professional skill. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that there will always be 
a continuing need for improvement. After all, no matter 
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how well the profession as a whole might perform, even 
a single poor audit performance causes public disillu­
sionment and harms the entire profession. Of course, 
some problems might be expected from the tremendous 
number of audits that are conducted each year. But, 
even a single audit failure is one too many if it could 
reasonably have been prevented.
Testifying before Senator Metcalf’s Subcommittee 
last Spring, I stressed the urgency for the profession 
to develop imaginative new procedures to assure con­
sistent, high quality work by all accounting firms and 
to prevent, to the extent reasonably possible, audit 
failures before they occur.
Accordingly, we proposed a challenging program 
to maintain and upgrade the quality of work in the 
accounting profession. It would have involved direct 
SEC oversight of periodic, in-depth peer reviews of 
an accounting firm’s system for assuring the quality 
of its audit practice.
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That proposal was hailed and criticized. Admit­
tedly, it was strong medicine. But, it reflected our 
commitment that the performance of our profession be 
kept at the highest level possible and that public confi­
dence in our work be maintained and strengthened.
The profession has responded impressively since 
that time. For example, the new SEC practice section 
created within the AICPA will impose stringent standards 
on member firms, including a requirement for periodic 
peer reviews of each firm’s audit practice. That plan, 
as proposed, did not go as far as Price Waterhouse ini­
tially preferred, but it does represent a constructive 
response to proper public concerns. Accordingly, Price 
Waterhouse will participate in the plan. Furthermore, 
we will strive to help improve the plan, where possible, 
to the end that it be as effective as possible.
We believe that any consideration of legislation 
to regulate the profession should be stayed for a suf­
ficient period of time to afford the AICPA plan the
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opportunity to succeed. It has not yet had that 
opportunity.
We are encouraged that as a critical first step 
in making the plan effective, the profession has 
attracted citizens of great stature and respect to serve 
on the Public Oversight Board. That Board’s efforts 
will be fundamental to the success of the profession’s 
efforts, and equally significant, to the public’s per­
ception of the integrity and effectiveness of the plan.
III. EXPANDED ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
ASPECTS OF AUDIT PRACTICE
There is one area, however, where there is need 
for expanded attention — the international aspects 
of audit engagements.
The profession’s plan, as we have said, is an 
impressive step to assure that the quality of audit 
practice is kept at a uniformly high level in the United 
States. But, any concern with audit quality today must 
take into account the need for quality control standards
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on an international level. As the Metcalf Subcommittee
Report, published last November, pointed out:
"Investors and the public in this 
country have a direct interest in the 
quality of auditing performed on 
multinational corporations in other 
countries."
Chairman Williams recently reemphasized that
point in an address to the profession:
"As American businesses have grown 
into multinational corporations, the 
need for achieving the same high level 
of auditing standards in foreign 
countries has grown commensurately. 
Foreign operations today represent 
a significant portion of the business 
of many U.S. coprorations. Investors 
are entitled to expect and should 
receive the same level of profes­
sionalism and judgment from an 
independent auditor in these foreign 
countries as they expect and receive 
in the United States."
We agree fully with those statements. United
States investors have the right to expect that the 
consolidated financial statements of a U.S. corporation 
correctly reflect not only the corporation's operations 
in the United States, but its operations in foreign 
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countries as well. And, the accounting firm reporting 
on those statements must have procedures to assure that 
the same high standards applied in auditing the corpora­
tion’s activities in the United States are also applied 
to its activities abroad.
Price Waterhouse has long recognized these 
requirements.
Price Waterhouse & Co. was established in the 
United Kingdom in 1849. The U.S. firm was founded in 
1890 and we have been involved in an international 
practice for more than 85 years. Today, worldwide, 
the various Price Waterhouse firms have more than 1100 
partners and 17,000 employees practicing in 89 countries. 
There are 283 offices of Price Waterhouse firms across 
the globe.
Price Waterhouse firms have long been committed 
to a system of international quality control. Through 
this experience, we have developed a dual mechanism 
to assure the quality of our international audit practice.
We have:
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(i) well-established standards to assure high 
quality work on each multinational audit engagement, 
wherever that work is performed; and
(ii) an international structure which establishes 
uniform standards and monitors the quality of work on 
an international level.
First, we have adopted specific procedures to 
assure that each international audit engagement for 
a United States multinational client is performed 
according to U.S. accounting and auditing standards. 
A United States firm partner is in charge of each audit 
engagement for a United States client of the firm. 
That partner has the responsibility to satisfy himself 
that the entire audit — no matter where conducted or 
by whom — is performed according to U.S. standards.
Any international audit for a United States 
client, in short, is under the control of the U.S. firm 
of Price Waterhouse & Co. which accepts full responsi­
bility for its report on the consolidated financial 
statements.
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There are other situations, however, where the 
work of Price Waterhouse firms can have an impact in 
the United States. For example, a Price Waterhouse 
firm abroad may report on the financial statements of 
a foreign client which are filed with the SEC. Or a 
Price Waterhouse firm abroad may report on a subsidiary 
of a United States corporation and that report is relied 
upon by another accounting firm. Our international 
organization has recently instituted policies to ensure 
that in these situations the reports of our related 
firms are subject to review by the U.S. firm.
The second element in our quality control 
mechanism is a strong international structure and sys­
tematic arrangements to monitor and maintain the con­
tinued high level of competence of all Price Waterhouse 
firms. Effective quality control procedures within 
each Price Waterhouse firm are a primary feature of 
our program.
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Price Waterhouse has long had an international 
structure which has evolved over the years in response 
to changing conditions in the world economy; its basic 
mission is to provide an effective device to establish 
and maintain high standards of practice on an inter­
national level.
Therefore, the Price Waterhouse firms, at the 
end of World War II, formalized a worldwide structure 
through the establishment of an international partner­
ship. It was created to establish and maintain uniform 
high standards of professional work and conduct among 
all the individual Price Waterhouse practice firms. 
This helps us to ensure the ability of each individual 
Price Waterhouse firm to provide services of the highest 
uniform quality to clients throughout the world.
Following more than 25 years of experience in 
coordination and cooperation on an international level, 
in 1973 the partners in each of the Price Waterhouse 
firms joined together into a single worldwide partnership — 
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Price Waterhouse International (PWI). Decisions and 
actions of PWI are taken by a General Council made up 
of representatives of each of the Price Waterhouse firms. 
The PWI Partnership Agreement authorizes the Council 
to require the withdrawal of any PWI partner for pro­
fessional misconduct, for willful failure to adhere 
to PWI professional standards, and for other designated 
conduct.
The PWI structure, with headquarters in London, 
works effectively toward achieving an integrated 
organization to continuously improve the quality of 
professional services throughout the world. It is under 
the guidance of a full-time chairman and an executive 
organization which has:
— formulated and established policies and 
standards on critical issues such as 
independence, auditing and accounting;
— coordinated and reviewed worldwide efforts 
for manpower, recruiting, career development, 
and continuing education;
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— arranged for the interchange of personnel 
among Price Waterhouse firms around the world;
— formulated and disseminated technical and 
other professional materials in furtherance 
of its worldwide policies and standards; 
and
— possibly most significantly, required quality 
control reviews of audit practices on a 
worldwide basis. Under the PWI program the 
audit practice of each Price Waterhouse office 
anywhere in the world is reviewed at least 
once every three years either under a firm- 
conducted program approved by PWI or by 
another Price Waterhouse firm designated 
by PWI. The scope of this program is as 
fully comprehensive as that of the review 
program recently adopted by the AICPA; its 
coverage of practice units is more com­
prehensive .
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Each partner of PWI — that is, each individual 
partner of each Price Waterhouse firm — is bound to 
observe not only the professional standards of the 
territory in which he practices, but also the frequently 
more demanding international policies and standards 
established by PWI. Moreover, since 1959 it has been 
a formal requirement of our international organization 
that any examination of financial statements which are 
known to be prepared to comply with requirements of 
a country other than that in which the firm doing the 
work practices, must meet, insofar as practicable, pro­
fessional standards and requirements at least as high 
as those that prevail in the country where the financial 
statements will be used.
These then are the basic elements of the system 
we at Price Waterhouse have adopted to ensure the quality 
of our practice throughout the world. It is a system 
that we continue to monitor, develop and improve as 
the need arises to enable Price Waterhouse firms to 
provide one worldwide standard of excellence.

